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WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE BENHAL ARMY

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WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE BENGAL ARMY?

BY

QUI HI.

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget."

VIRG. ÆNEID.

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WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE BENGAL ARMY?

WHAT is to be done with the Bengal army—how much longer are the Medo-Persian rules of an absurd routine to triumph over those of common sense, and official twaddle to be accepted in lieu of action?

Are we yet for a season to continue blind to the uses of adversity, and acquiesce in a system which has brought our Indian empire to the verge of ruin?

The wisdom of our ancestors held it as an axiom, that *similia similibus curantur;* and on this principle, certainly, we might entrust to official imbecility the task of repairing its own crimes and blunders.

Loud is now the nation's cry for vengeance on the mutinous and murderous Bengal army; and loudly do our officials re-echo this *Carthago est delenda:* it is not in deprecation of this vengeance that I raise my voice; it is to show the means by which this may best be obtained, and that in the clamour we may not lose sight of those culprits whose dishonesty, ignorance, and infatuation combined, have caused the demoralisation of that army, and with it unparalleled misery to so many thousands. By all means, destroy the mutineers; but, as a necessary and happily an easy preliminary step, annihilate the wretched system which has just worked out its own inevitable results; and thus not only will the triumph of justice be complete, but the means will be afforded, through which alone we can hope for success, assured and final, in this struggle.

In ordinary times, it is impossible to excite any strong or general interest in the concerns of posses-

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sions so distant as India. While all appears serene there, it is assumed that everything is being carried on correctly; and it is only at a juncture like the present, when our possession of it appears to be passing from us, that any strong feeling can be excited on the subject. Few then remain insensible to the fact, that such a loss would, in some greater or less degree, injuriously affect their personal interests; and that, by retaining that country, they secure a certain degree of personal benefit. In this view of the case, all are more or less responsible for Indian misgovernment. Our present calamity may be considered as a Divine judgment, certainly as a warning, for the imperfect discharge of an important trust committed to us; and terrible, indeed, would be the mockery of that wrath, which would make our imaginary blind zeal for the spread of the Gospel, the engine for the destruction of a government which has uniformly and steadily discountenanced every attempt to fulfil this Christian duty.

This is not a branch of the subject on which I wish to dwell at great length; but I cannot refrain from entering my protest against the assertions of those who pretend to trace to the efforts of the missionaries, the excitement that now threatens to overturn our empire. Even ignoring all our obligations as Christians, I am convinced, that had we, from the first, adopted the rational and consistent course of insisting that our religion should have a fair and free field, though no pre-eminence, and asserted for its proselytes a perfect equality before the law, we should have pursued a policy more intelligible, and less unsatisfactory to Hindoo and Mussulman, than the complaisant course we have adopted, which they are incapable of appreciating, and which has perpetuated in them a vague, uneasy apprehension, that underhand measures for their forcible conversion are being taken, which at present we dare not avow.

To expect a direct and palpable interposition of Divine aid in any difficulty, is what neither Scripture nor experience warrant; yet I nevertheless believe, that God's blessing will avail more than the strongest array of bayonets; and I wish our policy had been such as to deserve it. Calamities like the present, may well shake even a great philosopher's faith in the axiom, that "Providence always sides with the strong bayonets." The great Napoleon (with whom the saying originated) found reason to distrust it, when the event he deemed an impossibility—that the arms should drop from the hands of his soldiers—literally came to pass. The government of India has placed all its reliance on the same false principle; and, in carrying it out, has made the most egregious blunders—the analogy is strong: *Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*

Let us suppose, however, either that Christianity does not really impose on its adherents the obligation of using every means, short of coercion, for the spread of the Gospel—or that, being itself a delusion, the government is justified in showing a marked disapproval of the efforts made for its propagation. Are we to go one step further, and, in deference to the bigotry of paganism, shut out the light of reason, stop the progress of civilisation, and suspend the work of education—which, whether religious or secular, is alike fatal to the existence of heathenism? Unless prepared to go this length, I cannot imagine how our position will be improved, among a people incapable of discriminating between the various opponents of their superstitions — between the most humble Christian, and the most profound philosopher —between the preacher of Christ, and the preacher of the goddess of reason — between the man who would persuade them that there is but one only, the living and true God, and the man who assures them that there is no God at all, at least no Providence, and therefore no need of worship.

I have no hesitation in affirming that the Calcutta baboos, converts to philosophy—enlightened "Young Bengal"—by engrafting on their native abominations the particular blackguardism of fast men in England, with the nonchalance of men who believe in nothing at all, have done more to excite against us the horror of their countrymen, than has been caused by all the real or avowed conversions to Christianity. For, as all that is absolutely essential in Hindooism is, the abstaining from certain kinds of food, and observing certain idiotical forms and ceremonies; so, in the native view, the essence of Christianity is contained in the eating of so-called abominations, and disregarding those superstitious observances; and, therefore, these men are assumed to be Christian, all their indignant protests notwithstanding. Avowed infidelity cannot be admitted as an offset, by the votaries of a paganism, which, resting entirely on the above-named works, permits them to believe in anything, in everything, or in nothing, without prejudice to their orthodoxy.

I think if anything has been irresistibly demonstrated during this outbreak it is, that superstitions which instigate to such atrocities are dangerous to the stability of any civilised government; that to any toleration their right rests exclusively on their might; and that to shirk our duty of spreading the gospel will avail nothing in allaying the apprehensions of a heathenism so suspicious, so savage, so idiotical, treacherous and brutal. The ultimate triumph of civilisation and enlightenment is inevitable; is it to be supposed that Christianity—the perfection and realization of these—is to be excluded from participation therein? If the fall of heathenism in India be a mere question of time, it is equally certain that the masses there must have some religion; and common sense suggests the policy of trying to bind them to us by a common faith, even were this not our im-

perative duty as Christians. It is notorious that the most disaffected of our native subjects are the philosophical Calcutta baboos; and, but for the cowardice inherent in every Bengalee, they would be the most dangerous. A consistent and manly policy is, therefore, not merely right, but expedient. Let us dismiss all *missionary officers, civil or military:* preaching is not their vocation; and to these weak-minded zealots, who neglect their legitimate duties, disobey the government, and embarrass its action by this abuse of its authority, I would show no mercy. But, while punishing impertinent interlopers, let every encouragement be afforded to legitimate labourers: shrink not from supplying them with the amplest means of furthering this most desirable object; and above all, give them the encouragement that would result from largely availing ourselves of the services of their converts, and not scrupling to prove (what we only betray and perpetuate our weakness in concealing) that we *do* consider the profession of Christianity a guarantee for a servant's fidelity.

Ten just men would have saved Sodom; and, had there been even ten Christian soldiers in a native regiment, no such combinations as we have seen could ever have been formed to overthrow us. Our excessive caution, we now find, has failed to avert those evils we so much dreaded; and, my belief is, that it has precipitated them. At all events, instead of strengthening ourselves for the inevitable shock, we have to meet it in that state of isolation and weakness, which we so absurdly imagined would prove a safeguard.

I trust, however, we are now rid of the delusion that has cost us so much; that we have discovered that our greatest danger in India is the existence of a heathenism, too rancorous and insensate to be appeased by moderation, or reasoning—that if regard for the spiritual welfare of its unhappy victims be no

sufficient cause, our own security requires such temperate efforts to be made for assimilating their faith to ours—that, while carefully abstaining from anything like persecution, or injustice, we are determined to make ourselves respected; and, by God's blessing, to hold by the sword, that which the sword has given us, and shrink from our duties as little as from our rights.

As I shall have occasion to point out to how serious an extent Lord Dalhousie is responsible for our present disasters, I gladly avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the true greatness and wisdom he showed in regard to the subject of which I have been speaking. I think he is entitled to the very highest praise, both as a statesman and as a Christian, for having so courageously swept away all the penalties under which Christian converts suffered; and for having, moreover, so unhesitatingly availed himself of the opportunities which presented themselves of introducing important improvements in the moral and social condition of the Hindoos themselves.

Had he but given a like attention to the concerns of the army, he would have averted those dangers which now even his very best acts have aggravated.

Most creditable, I think, to ministers, is the energy they have displayed in the prompt despatch to India of so large a European force; nor can I concur with Mr. Disraeli, in regarding the cheerful and manly bearing they preserve under the difficulty, as any proof of insensibility to its magnitude: but what I do most earnestly deprecate is, the postponement till things are settled, of the *reforms necessary to effect that settlement.* Surely at no time can great changes create less inconvenience than at the moment of a convulsion, which has turned everything topsy-turvy; never can a system have less claim for consideration than just when, in breaking down, it manifests its inherent worthlessness.

No one has larger faith than I have in what may possibly be effected by the unaided valour of British soldiers; but, with such odds against us, it would surely be madness to neglect, or defer employing any means, which might give us the effective assistance of large bodies of natives; not merely on the field of battle but in the far more serious, desultory warfare, by which our government must thereafter expect to be harassed, for an indefinite period. Yet, important as are the considerations of the material aid to be thus derived in the actual struggle, still more so are the political advantages, which would be gained, by largely employing native agency in punishing native rebels. We should divert from ourselves the odium which must be incurred in exact proportion to the degree in which we personally engaged in those severities that must be inflicted: we should destroy the hope of future combinations, when one formed under the most favourable circumstances so signally failed, and fidelity is proved to be the more profitable course; and we would show the mutineers how little sympathy their wrongs, real or pretended, can excite in their own districts, where we find an ample supply of aspirants to fill their place. To me it appears impossible to over-estimate the moral effect which would be produced (not merely in India, but throughout the civilized world) by raising among a people, believed to be hostile to our rule, and, at the critical period when our position seems so isolated and perilous, a fresh army, whose service, in crushing that which has revolted, would prove the best guarantee for its own future fidelity. In making this suggestion, I point to nothing that would be impracticable, or even very difficult to carry out.

For upwards of a century, we have had an unlimited command of such levies as formed that Bengal army, which (whatever it may now have become) gained for us an empire, of which it was the *decus*

and the *tutamen*. Lamentable as have been the errors that gradually ruined an army that so long and so faithfully served us, I cannot for an instant doubt that our prestige, backed by the large force of British soldiers now sent out, will prove sufficient to convince all India that our ultimate triumph is certain, and bind to our interest those classes from which an army could be raised worthy of implicit confidence. All, however, must depend on the direction (whether for good or evil) given it by the system we adopt from the outset. If we benefit by our dear-bought experience, we shall steer clear of those errors by which we disorganised our late army; and any retribution with which we may visit their misdeeds will, then, not only be safe, but will tend to strengthen the authority we vindicate.

No greater fallacy could I think be imagined, than that which would contemplate the possibility of retaining India mainly through the agency of British troops. Though it may be necessary for a considerable time to maintain there such a force as has never hitherto been thought requisite, and to make a corresponding reduction in the number of our native soldiery, yet we shall but complicate our difficulties under any system which does not put at our disposal a large and efficient native army. Could our country even bear the drain of men required to keep up so large a European force, the finances of India must soon succumb, under the pressure of the enormous expenditure it would occasion. The very fact, that a European regiment never marches except accompanied by a detachment of natives to take its guards, may serve to convey to the British public some idea of the exotic state of English troops in India, and the impossibility of their performing general duties.

For Government to resolve to discard native troops from its service in Bengal, would be about as reasonable as for private individuals, whose native servants

had on this occasion misbehaved, to determine never again to employ any but Europeans.

Much has been said and written as to the causes of this great mutiny; but the whole matter, I think, resolves itself into this, that the men were successfully tampered with, because, under our system, their European officers had little or no influence over them. Russian spies there may have been (though I doubt it), who plied their treacherous arts on this occasion. Faqueers I think it probable there were, who went about the country proclaiming our approaching downfall. Old Bengal (important by its wealth) did, we know, keep an incessant howl over expiring Hindoo orthodoxy; and no one can pretend to say what means might have been resorted to by the society it supports, for the preservation of its heathenism in all its catholicity and its uncleanness. Not less notorious is the hatred borne us by "Young Chucherbutty"; and it is improbable that the stream of blasphemous and seditious trash (which he concocts, it is said, over a steak and champagne) should have been suspended just at the time of there being hope that it would do us some injury. How far matters may have been aggravated by any of these or other such like causes, I cannot *divine* (as Sir W. G. might say); but what I am sure of is, that the Sepoys had no hatred to the government, though they had no love, and would unhesitatingly have stood by us against every foe, foreign or domestic, had they not really believed that in serving out those greased cartridges we had devised a scheme for ruining their caste. It was only when they believed that we were guilty of treachery to them that they fell away from us. Mahomedan conspirators skilfully availed themselves of the egregious blunder, which ignorance and self-sufficiency committed; but had European officers possessed but ordinary influence with their men, their explanations would have been accepted, in

preference to the distorted colouring which the agents of the miscreant King of Delhi gave to the matter.

I can see no reason for the hesitation, which many who know, or ought to know, something of native character express, about accepting the cartridge affair, as a sufficient cause for the excitement it was supposed to have produced. I can only, indeed, express my wonder that any such could conceive of a limit, to the horror and rage, which would be excited in Hindoos or Mahomedans, who believed they were being inveigled into tasting cow's or pig's fat.

To our red tape and routine we owe it, that there *were* men so idiotical as thus to outrage the feeling of an army, and that there *were not* men who could repair the mischief these idiots had effected.

People may argue that there is something inherently Satanic in the Sepoy's nature. Satanic, it is proved that he may become; but if he be inherently so, our position in India is untenable; for, with all their faults, the Sepoys are, taken as a body, the "crême de la crême" of the country.

Some systems are so dexterously devised, that the one weak point under which they finally break down is not observed by the projectors until the occurrence of the catastrophe. Thus, the ingenious plan of reducing a horse's food till the brute is rendered capable of existing without any, did not betray its inherent defect till the reduction had been brought to a single straw; or, we may take an equally apt illustration in the story of a camel loaded to that degree where a single extra feather weight caused him to break down. The horse or camel may equally well be taken as types of the Indian army, the bright genius under which it sank was my Lord Dalhousie I do not mean to say that this illustrious nobleman was the originator of the system, but, as Falstaff suggests of Worcester's rebellion, "it lay in his way and he found it." I may add, he adopted it *con*

amore. He it was who deprived the regimental officers of the last vestige of *esprît de corps*, by stamping them yet more clearly as an inferior class of men, good for nothing but to perform such drudgery as their more gifted brethren had been relieved from. Amazed, as he no doubt is at the result, he, happily for himself, secured his reward ere the catastrophe occurred. Now he may point to his marquisate and pension of £5,000 per annum as proofs of the approval his policy met with. He may yet even twit his successor with having failed to continue in this dead body that spasmodic action, which he persuaded the British public was a healthy and vigorous existence.

"The position of the native soldier in India has long been such as to have hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of improvement."—*Dalhousie, Minute of 28th February*, 1856.

In the case of Lord Dalhousie, as one of the ablest men who ever obtained such an appointment, we have the best illustration of the evils of our system, which throws every office of great trust, dignity, and emolument into the hands of the aristocratic party; and it is the first of the evils, I shall notice, with which the Bengal army has been cursed. Colonial governorships are among the good things to which the British oligarchy appears to have established an indefeasible right, far too valuable to be voluntarily sacrificed: and to appoint any one merely for peculiar aptitude for such a post, and without reference to his aristocratic connexion, would be an innovation from which the most radical of premiers would shrink aghast.

But in the list of titled nonentities who have been sent out to misgovern India, Lord Dalhousie stands forth in bright relief. With ability sufficient to have secured him at home a position as elevated, and in which he would certainly have been more useful, it suited his circumstances to accept the more lucrative

appointment. By his great administrative ability, he did much for the social and material improvement of India, and he wanted only political honesty, and some practical acquaintance with the people, to have repaired those evils which his policy had only the effect of aggravating to that point at which they threaten to overwhelm us.

Lord Dalhousie's dishonesty, as a statesman, was, throughout his viceroyalty, evinced in the aggressive and ambitious policy he pursued, both in the war he provoked, and in the greed which was ever framing fresh pretexts for quietly pouncing upon petty native states; whose inability to defend the rights and possessions we had ourselves allowed them, appears to him to have afforded a convincing proof of their unworthiness to continue in the enjoyment of them. But, in truth, his Lordship's ambition seems to have been that of a financier rather than of a conqueror—of a chancellor of the exchequer rather than of a premier. The game of annexation did not pay its expenses; but repeated failures only spurred him on to fresh predatory achievements, till at length the passion became a sort of monomania. From plundering semi-independent rajahs, he took to robbing British subjects, and condescended to deprive government creditors of one per cent. of the interest they were entitled to, by an offer of repayment which he well knew he was not in a position to have carried out.

"Honesty is the best policy"; and, perhaps, in a governor-general, some part of his Lordship's brilliant talents might have been advantageously exchanged for a somewhat clearer appreciation of this truth. It is very obvious that his acquisitiveness has had the tendency of exciting the Bengal Sepoys to do, on their own account, a little—robbing, he, of course in their case, admits it to be. They are, at all events, thereby furnished with another plausible excuse; for—*proh*

pudor!— even the master-stroke of the conversion of the 5 per cents. has not escaped their notice; they have publicly avowed themselves the avengers of the wrongs, not merely of native princes, but of the moneyed interest!!!

It is very easy to pooh-pooh inferences such as these; but will Lord Dalhousie venture to affirm, that, supposing his example did not awaken any similar cupidity in others, and, as is more than probable, that other causes rendered the mutiny inevitable, we should not have been better prepared to meet it, with Oude, Nagpore, etc., etc., unannexed, the apprehensions of other states not excited, and the moneyed class not smarting under the conviction that they had been swindled. Lord Dalhousie's policy reacted most perniciously on the army, by swelling the crowd of malcontents, who had no hope left of righting themselves, other than in corrupting its fidelity. His unscrupulous policy really justified much that was said of it, and rendered belief easy in those monstrous lies that caused the outbreak.

But I am considering Lord Dalhousie's administration only as it affected the Bengal army; and am bound to admit, that had he possessed any real acquaintance with its constitution and requirements, he might have rendered it a safe tool for supporting him in any course of injustice that did not affect its own interests—in the spoliation of every semi-independent rajah, or in sponging out the entire national debt.

To the mere abstract question of right or wrong, Hindoo Sepoys are more indifferent than the noble lord himself: Bengalees they detest; and despise them in regard to their religious, social, and physical condition: to Mahomedans their hatred is more intense, because mixed with fear and distrust; and as for foreign emissaries, Sepoys are credulous only in matters of religion, and would prefer anything that might be obtained from the liberality of the govern-

ment on denouncing them, to any promises or to any amount of bribes which it would be possible for such persons to distribute among them. Without nationality, with but one bond of union that, touched upon, might be equally dangerous—but with all the bearings of which we ought, ere now, to be thoroughly acquainted—men better adapted to perform every service we can require, could nowhere be found, than in the ignorant, simple, and indolent, though courageous, natives of the provinces from which the Bengal army is recruited. Firmness, and judgment based on experience, are all that we require to rule them; but these are indispensable.

Unfortunately, Lord Dalhousie, lofty and imperious as he was, seems to have been incapable of appreciating, as despots might have done, the importance of maintaining the efficiency of the native army; and was quite ignorant of the means of doing so. His maxim of *Cedant arma togæ*, cannot in India be safely carried out in the style he adopted; but with him the feeling became intensified by the fact, that in the toga he could see only his noble self: he was not merely a civilian; but was, as it were, the impersonation of the entire civil service. If he had sympathy for any portion of the army, it was the European; but financial considerations—the costliness of the article—were probably the mainspring of his solicitude for it. In the native army he saw only a meaner description of servants, paid for doing his bidding, of which the most important part was the carrying out his mischievously aggressive policy. Though in his position it would have been utterly impossible to have gained, by personal observation, any insight into their character, he uniformly acted upon the theory which he framed for himself at the outset—that the army could never become so dangerous through neglect, as to warrant an expenditure in reforming it, which might involve the necessity of

deferring his plans—many of them, I confess, admirable—for the material improvement of the country.

As the Governor-General has the chief authority over the army, it cannot be disputed that he should have the chief share of the blame for its inefficiency; and Lord Dalhousie's unquestionable ability precludes the possibility of supposing anything but wilful neglect in his case. He had abundant and overwhelming proof, that the system was rotten to the very core: he was long on intimate terms with a Gough and a Gomm—men whose mental calibre must have been apparent to him in their first five minutes' conversation; yet he readily acquiesced in their incompetency. Their indisposition to do anything, or suggest any thing, he probably felt a relief, when he considered what such men might do, and might suggest. It is generally believed, indeed, that he had serious intentions of removing Lord Gough from his command, at the critical period when that general's wretched blundering nearly caused our ruin in the Sutledge campaign. It is certain that his representations influenced ministers in sending out Sir Charles Napier, post-haste, to relieve him; while Sir W. Gomm (whose military and general capacity was known to be much on a par with Lord Gough's) was unceremoniously and ignominiously turned away, on presenting himself in Calcutta to take up this appointment, which had first been given to him. The imminence of the peril alarmed Lord Dalhousie; but, the crisis having been surmounted by the desperate valour—and, alas! the cruel sacrifice—of British soldiers, he scrupled not to bestow the chief praise on the man whose incompetency was notorious to all India; and had by none been deplored more vehemently, than by his lordship.

His treatment of Sir Charles Napier, on the other hand, proves that Lord Dalhousie much preferred

that the army should be without any real head. His *amour-propre* was wounded by the independence of that rude old soldier. He at first blandly received Sir Charles's plans, praised their wisdom, and quietly shelved them — they might have been judicious enough, but he had more important matters to carry out. Of course, no one felt surprised that a quarrel should break out between one of the most irascible and one of the most haughty of men. Lord Dalhousie's polished style, and brilliant powers of sarcasm, backed by a Satanic placidity and proud humility, enabled him to offer a highly plausible refutation of his infuriated opponent's clumsily expressed arguments; but few, I apprehend, will now venture to deny that Sir Charles formed a more just estimate of the condition and requirements of the Bengal army —affected, moreover, as these were, by the general policy which his lordship was carrying out.

Napier was succeeded by Gomm, who appears to have felt no spark of delicacy about again accepting an appointment, which had been so unceremoniously cancelled, when it was felt that *any* "respectable old gentleman" would *not* suffice for it. As, happily, he had no opportunity of playing the fool anywhere but in his own snug quarters at Simla, or on the pleasure tours undertaken on the plea of inspecting the army, he gave Lord Dalhousie great satisfaction; their only serious difference of opinion having been, as to the right of the Commander-in-Chief to indent on the commissariat for note-paper as well as the foolscap, to which it was conceded that he had an unquestionable claim! I have reason to believe that their harmony was not permanently destroyed by his lordship deciding, that his excellency's pay had been fixed at £18,000 per annum, to enable him to defray even the cost of his own note-paper.

While indifferent to the fact that the army continued without a *head*, his lordship was equally indif-

ferent to its deficiencies in regard to other members. His judgment, or his honesty, in the bestowal of his military patronage is illustrated in the case of his nominee, General Hewitt, an officer somewhat unjustly blamed for not evincing, on an emergency, those qualities, of which it had always been notorious that God had never granted him the slightest modicum.

In bestowing less important military appointments —except where he could gain some *éclat* by rewarding some extraordinary achievement—his lordship was not so fortunate as to inspire a general belief, that he was indifferent to the chance of strengthening his political interest at home, on the good old Scotch principle of "claw me, claw thee," though few could deny that on many occasions he could have been actuated only by the most disinterested private friendship; but where neither of these motives were palpable, he was considered, I believe, to be a good deal guided by caprice.

While Lord Dalhousie considered it no part of his duty to make one effort for the improvement of the morality and tone of feeling among the regimental officers—albeit the fact was notorious that these were daily becoming lower, and injuriously re-acted on the discipline of their regiments—he could, on occasions where no moral turpitude was ever alleged, and where only his own idiosyncracy was touched, interfere in the most harsh and arbitrary manner. One instance will suffice to illustrate his mode of carrying out his grand principle of snubbing the military. The commandant of the 6th N.I. he suspended from his duty, and his allowances for six months, for the crime of asserting his authority in the cantonment he commanded, and turning out of it an impertinent young civilian who resisted it. The station staff he deprived of his appointment, for carrying out the orders of his own commanding officer. The injured civilian

illustrated the degree of forbearance he had previously shown by devising means still further to annoy the officers of that corps. Among other things he trumped up a charge of *dacoitee* against a number of their men, which (after harassing them with a vexatious and unwarrantable prosecution) he was obliged to drop, and got wigged for his conduct by his own superiors, not including Lord Dalhousie, however. Now, as the mutiny in the 6th N I. was marked by circumstances of uncommon atrocity and treachery, can we here not trace something of cause and effect? Is it at all reasonable, I would ask, to expect that Sepoys will respect officers whom their own government does not respect; that discipline will be preserved, when there is, even in cantonments, an *imperium in imperio*, that can first defy the commandant, then pounce upon the men themselves, and subject them to a disgraceful prosecution, simply to spite the officers, and prove how little dependance the Sepoys need place in their protection?

But had Lord Dalhousie been blind to every other sign of the times, he could not ignore the fact, that two mutinies had occurred during his own viceroyalty. The first of these was the direct consequence of his reducing the Punjab allowances, and, for a time, it rendered our position highly precarious, though his lordship, who was at the time at sea, thought proper to make very light of the matter, when he returned and found it all settled. I do not mean to say that the reduction of batta, which caused that mutiny, was foolish, the folly consisted in failing to discover that there were some radical defects in a system which showed such results; and, if he did not fail to see this, his infatuation was still greater, in entirely neglecting the consideration of a remedy.

The second of the mutinies, for the neglect of which Lord Dalhousie is responsible, was less serious in itself, but marked by greater infatuation on his part,

for it was never put down. The 38th Native Infantry were required to proceed down the coast by sea, and they refused, so they were allowed to go by land. "Let them go then, and thank God you are rid of the knaves;" seems to have been literally the direction given by the most noble marquis: moreover, this was all the action taken upon it. We have corps raised for general service; we might raise any number for this purpose: yet it was to Lord Dalhousie's successor that we are indebted for the very natural and obvious remedy of directing that henceforth all recruits should be enlisted for general service, i.e. to go by sea or by land as may be required.

The supreme indifference manifested by Lord Dalhousie for all that concerned the native army, and his slight acquaintance with this subject, proves that abilities of a very high order can neither gain their possessor the peculiar aptness for the post he filled, nor compensate for the want of it. I submit that the first requisite for the Indian army, and not less so for India in general, is, that the governor should be possessed of Indian experience.

I presume no one will deny that such men as Sir John Lawrence, or General Outram, would be more competent for the post of Governor-General than Lord Canning can possibly be; if so, why is not the change made at once? Simply because the cry of "the right man in the right place" is disregarded, and the nearest approach we can find to the principle is, *to put in the right man to advise the wrong man in the nice berth.* If the salvation of India depended upon it, I believe the feeling of Lord Canning on the subject would be pronounced more worthy of consideration by our officials. Those who, like myself, depend upon India for their means of support, and who would be reduced to absolute beggary were it lost, cannot be expected to feel any such delicacy. I speak of a Gough, or a Gomm, or a Dalhousie, or a

Canning, simply as regards their performance of public duties, and have a right to speak plainly when my all is at stake. Two at least of these men, I have every reason to believe, kind-hearted and estimable in private life; but kind-hearted and estimable men who undertake public duties for which they are unfit, must expect to be spoken of with bitterness by those whom their folly threatens with ruin.

Of Lord Canning I know nothing personally; and, up to the time of the outbreak, he had done little by which any estimate of his ability could be formed, except on the not unfair inference, that he who gives no striking proof of ability has no great ability to give proof of. He now certainly appears to have shown personal intrepidity; and, as far as proclamations go, to have evinced great determination of character; but his acts do not confirm this favourable impression. The muzzling the press (the European portion of it I mean) was assuredly a mistake; it was a proof of a weak mind, for it was the press which rescued England from that destruction which was inevitable under the system it exposed. The rational plan for the Indian government to have adopted would have been to have placed the entire Bengal presidency under martial law. This would have given them absolute power over the press without placing them in the invidious position of direct antagonism, or of seeming to fear, or even anticipate, any hostility in that quarter. That the measure should have met the cordial approval of the official mind of Leadenhall street affords presumption against its wisdom; and, when we consider the energetic use that has already been made of it by the government, in the case of the *Friend of India*, and then contemplate the supine infatuation that permits, at such a juncture, the unrestricted sale of arms, we may feel very grave apprehensions as to the capacity of such men to surmount our present difficulties.

It would be useless now to enquire whether the Indian government did or did not show sufficient promptness and judgment in their efforts to allay the excitement caused by serving out greased cartridges. I firmly believe that they did not: but let them have the benefit of any doubt, which may be felt by some of those who can appreciate the difficulty of allaying the superstitious fears and apprehensions of the benighted Hindoo mind. More to the purpose is it to enquire if they are now employing every means available for repairing the mischief they have done. Two resources there are which (as far as we yet know) the government of India has entirely neglected. The first is to meet conspiracy with counter-plots—treachery with corruption—if such it can be called. Here some of our politicals might have an opportunity of shining; or, at least, have a chance of repairing the damage done to their pretensions to astuteness, when the hell-broth bubbled up, that had unobserved been so long simmering under their diplomatic noses. The "almighty dollar" is less influential in America than the rupee in India; the control of the public purse is not of greater use to the Commons, than the command of so much treasure would be to the Indian government, if judiciously employed. Bribery would, ere this, have opened the gates of Delhi, and enabled us to present to India the edifying spectacle of the Mogul scoundrel, with all his cubs, swinging in front of his own palace; while by these means, too, we could easily have spread dissension, distrust, and weakness throughout the ranks of the insurgents.

No one could oppose any well-founded scruples to such a course, least of all could the Indian government, that so largely used these means in the first Sutledge campaign. Captain Cunningham's book gives the fullest details of these transactions; and the truth of the narrative was stamped by the government that deprived him of his appointment, simply

because he told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Lord Dalhousie, who had no scruples in becoming the agent for wreaking on poor Cunningham the vengeance of those he had exposed, was not ashamed to justify the act, on the ground that, though Cunningham had received the court's permission to make use of public documents in writing his history, it was never contemplated that he would use them to the extent of an exposé such as this!! Poor Cunningham died of a broken heart; and my Lord Dalhousie lived to receive a pension of £5,000 per annum, as a reward for his dutiful conduct on this and other occasions.

The second of the resources which the Indian government seems to have lost sight of, is, to call out all pensioners for active service; for if anywhere we can find men in whom we may repose confidence, it is among those whom our fall would ruin.

Officials, we know, display great ingenuity in discovering objections to every plan, however little they may evince in offering practical suggestions; but I submit that this ensures the following advantages:—

1st. A reasonable prospect of enlisting a considerable number of faithful and experienced soldiers, still something better than mere food for powder, and who would besides give us a moral support in the country, much needed in our present circumstances.

2ndly. Exactly in proportion as we failed to obtain such services, would the finances of the state be relieved from the burthen of maintaining ungrateful scoundrels; for we could then, with a safe conscience, strike all such off the establishment.

There could be no difficulty in sending purwannahs, or at least printed notices, all through the very most disturbed parts of India; directing all pensioners to repair to any place convenient to government, and which they could name. Native agency might easily effect the object of circulating any number of

such bills: it would be but a question of a few hundred rupees.

There appears to be a beautiful harmony in the opinions of Downing-street and Horse-Guards, as to the value of Indian experience, in the posts of which they respectively have the patronage; and the superior advantages to be derived from the unadulterated wisdom, which would bend everything to Downing-street or Horse-Guards' regulations, rather than accommodate itself to any prejudices, in which those great institutions felt no sympathy.

The Horse-Guards' Commander-in-Chief, then, comes to India with a certainty of materially benefiting himself; but often, too, with a vague idea that he may in some way also benefit the government, as its chief military adviser. Accordingly, like the good-natured Mazeppa, he undertakes—

> "With such a hope to track
> His seventy years * of memory back."

But as this extensive experience all bears reference to the state of countries having nothing in common with that of India, the relation, I apprehend, rarely excites more attention at the council-table, than was paid to the thrilling narrative of the Cossack warrior by the royal Swede.

I know not that I need add anything to what I have incidentally brought forward, as to the value of these men; for Sir William Gomm has himself done all that could be required. I am content to rest the point on the spectacle presented by this old gentleman, who has favoured the British public with a long letter on the subject of this mutiny; the pith of which is, that he cannot, for the life of him, "divine" what made the army so naughty, as he never observed

* Or "fifty or sixty — it is all the same," as Donna Julia says.

anything wrong. He took, no doubt, very unnecessary trouble to gibbet himself, when he illustrated the intense ignorance he avowed, by adding, that he could not even form an idea on the subject. The loss of any idea of his can hardly be considered serious; but, unwittingly, he has thrown a good deal of light on the subject, by this zany-like avowal of ignorance. Knowing that it was *he* who for five years *commanded* (so to speak) the army that has mutinied, how few will be disposed to re-echo his foolish cry of "Who'd have thought it?"*

The Horse-Guards' generals, who come out for divisional commands, are certainly less unprofitable servants to the state, if it be admitted (as I suppose it will) that there is less loss in paying a man £5,000 per annum for doing nothing, than in paying him £18,000 for this return. They are, however, inferior to Company's generals, inasmuch as the latter (who have to contend only against the evil of approaching dotage, which is common to them both) need not, through utter ignorance of native character, make fools of themselves on ordinary occasions. General Elphinstone (of Cabul notoriety) may be taken as the type of the one class, as General Hewitt no doubt is of the other; though, happily, it rarely occurs that they obtain such opportunities of showing what they really are capable of doing, or rather of

* Though I can with a clear conscience declare, that I have not the slightest personal ill feeling towards Sir William Gomm, yet I feel it almost impossible to speak of him with any degree of patience. Here is an extract from his letter above alluded to: "To what cause, to what fatality this strange outbreak is owing—by what misunderstanding these miserable men have been led into such a course of wickedness — I do not pretend to divine." *Miserable men* indeed! but what can be said for the man who ascribes such things to *fatality*. Nero fiddled while Rome was burning; Gomm could only write sonnets — perhaps he sang them too — while the fire was smouldering in the Bengal army: and then commenced a squabble with the Supreme Government, as to who was to pay for the note paper he wasted on his doggrel.

not doing. A good staff, and still more frequently mere good luck, has often saved the state from the natural consequences of confiding important trusts to the incompetent; and has, too, procured the garnish of K.C.B. to a name, which public opinion had long branded with very different characters.

For the evil of Horse-Guards' influence, there is but one remedy; viz., to transfer permanently to India the contingent of twenty regiments, supplied by the crown; and thus, for ever sever their and our connection with the Horse-Guards, and its horse-marine chiefs and generals. As I would propose that the entire united army be made a royal one, I can conceive no possible objection to the plan, save in the interested opposition of the Horse-Guards; and of a few old fogies, who are looking out for the snug berths, which they fill with so much satisfaction to themselves, and real detriment to the best interests of India. There would be no difficulty in arranging the exchanges between the officers who wished to remain in the home army, and those who preferred the Indian. The rich would unhesitatingly choose the former, the poor the latter—the advantages seem balanced. England would be relieved of many expenses, which unavoidably fall upon her under the present system—among others, the pensions of the officers, and of many men, whose service has been almost entirely performed in India.

Even the finances of India might be relieved, in the saving of transport-hire on reliefs, and in the abolition of the useless staff kept up for Queen's troops; while the efficiency of the whole army would be also immensely improved. We should get rid of those jealousies that still hold some sway, and see the total abolition of the invidious distinction which excludes the officers of twenty regiments from participation in the benefit of staff appointments. Though that rule has lately been much relaxed, I question

the wisdom of having done so, while no security is given, that these officers will previously acquire the Indian experience desirable for carrying on their new duties.

The arrangement of transferring twenty regiments permanently to the Indian army, need not, of course, in any way affect the condition of those additional regiments, that this emergency has caused to be sent out: nor would it affect the present Commander-in-Chief, or any officers on the general or brigade staff, though their successors should be selected exclusively from the reformed Indian army.

Not the least important of the benefits incident to the amalgamation I propose, would be its paving the way to the abolition of the Court of Directors, with the corresponding nuisance—the Board of Control.

Never certainly was scheme of government more preposterously devised than this is to retard action, exalt routine, destroy the zeal, and damp the energies of its servants. It is literally the realisation and embodiment of Dickens' idea of the Circumlocution Office. Where it is possible to identify the particular action of the Court of Directors in any affair, we find it marked by a procrastinating, a make-shift, and cheese-paring policy, which might have been expected in the grocers and chandlers, its traditional founders. They acquiesce contentedly in a lavish expenditure for the notoriously inefficient staff, and establishments of the army, while they ever, at the very same time, display a morbid itching to clip the allowances and infringe on the rights of regimental officers. The half batta measure, a gross breach of faith, was their own bright conception; but the series of petty acts of injustice, carried out by Lord Dalhousie and his predecessors, have had the cordial approval of the Court, where they did not actually originate with it.

The Court of Directors affords a unique and singular instance—probably the only one that could be found since the beginning of the world—of a government disliked and distrusted by all classes of its *employées*. I never knew an officer, of whatever rank, who did not express and feel some contempt for the Court, and who had not, moreover, some distrust as to what new act of injustice it contemplated.

That this feeling has, to a very great extent, been imparted to the Sepoys is certain, for they have sufficient sagacity to perceive that a government, which regards not the rights of one section of its servants, will only be deterred by fear from disregarding those of the other. In this view of the case, the conduct of the Court has operated directly in producing this mutiny, and in aggravating its character.

For my part, I cannot conceive what we gain by continuing so barbarously complicated a machinery, as a Court of Directors to check the Indian Government, a Board of Control to check the Court, and a Premier to check the Board. If this be not the Circumlocution Office, or rather a conglomeration of such offices, I know not what it is. Its absurdity is hardly paralleled by Swift's idea of an ingenious machine for cutting cabbages almost as well as a common knife would do. May we not learn a little common sense from the hint given us by the great humourist? Is it, indeed, necessary that the Indian Government should, by every mail, forward a whole budget of trumpery references for the consideration of eighteen old gentlemen in Leaden Hall; and that these, after the usual expenditure of fiddle faddle (including abundance of twaddle), and interchange with the Board of Control of a large quantity of foolscap (for which one might easily suggest a much more appropriate use), should write "our Governor-General" that his "affectionate friends"—so they absurdly style themselves—accede to his request, that

unattached Ensign Snooks should, in consideration of his long and faithful services, be promoted to a like unattached lieutenancy on the veteran establishment? If we refer to a few more important matters left to their discretion, is it more satisfactory to learn that —— and ——, who were cashiered by courts-martial for fraud committed as bank directors, have fully satisfied the Honourable Court, and Mr. Smith of Cannon Row, that they were only the victims of a mistaken sense of what is called "banking propriety," and are to be restored forthwith to the honour, dignity, and emolument of the posts, of which they were so harshly deprived? The fact that they can turn their trifling power into a source of real mischief, of most serious import, is surely no argument in their favour.

Independently of the thousand-and-one trifles, on which these gentlemen are supposed to bring so much wisdom and experience to bear, what work do they perform? Is there any point of real importance, on which the minister of the day does not trust his own judgment, in preference to availing himself of the costly wisdom of Leaden Hall? Bah! Let us pitch away all this absurd machinery, and cut our cabbages with a common knife.

Get rid of all the tape-worms that prey upon the vitals of India, substitute a single Secretary of State for that country, and let him decide—not on trifles such as Snooks' claim to advancement, or on hair-splitting distinctions by which "banking propriety"! may be thought to justify what is certainly disgraceful for officers and gentlemen to do, but—on all great measures of real importance, such as it would be positively unsafe to leave unreservedly to the discretion of a Governor-General; and which, certainly, are never left for the final decision of the Court of Directors. As to the patronage there need be no difficulty, for it might be given up to public competition, by which I

apprehend the army would secure a description of officers immeasurably superior to those it owes to the disinterested discrimination of Leaden Hall, or of Cannon Row.

The Court has ever been an incubus on the advancement of India, and improvement of the army; and, under the simple system I propose, we should run no risk of seeing decency outraged, as it has been by this corporation. No Secretary of State, I venture to hope, would presume to restore to the army officers who had been cashiered on conviction of swindling!!! City interest, I believe, has led to more unpleasant doings in Leaden Hall, than ever were perpetrated in Downing Street. With the recollection of what red tape and routine nearly effected for England a short time ago, it would be madness to perpetuate the embodiment of these principles in our Indian Government, even had they not there also produced disasters incomparably greater. Red tape and foolscap may literally be called the emblems of a government that annually expends £30,000 on stationery. It would be interesting to know how much of this went for tape, and how much for foolscap; what the price of the ink was, and what saving could have been effected in that article, by omitting dots to the i's, and crosses to the t's, supposing such a breach of official propriety could have been permitted; but on these curious points I fear no detailed information can be expected.*

But there is no expedient which could be devised that would render the Bengal army trustworthy without the aid of able and zealous officers: and it was

* In Leaden Hall it is the system itself that is the evil, and no repairs, short of those required by the highlander's gun, could get it into working order. It is not strange, then, that we find gentlemen quite useless as Directors, who might really be well fitted for the post of Secretary of State for India.

because it was not so commanded that the mutiny has spread in the way we have seen.

It may, indeed, be objected, that some officers—the best and the best-liked—were ruthlessly murdered by the men who affected to feel so much regard for them. But it would, I think, be begging the whole question to infer, from such isolated cases, that no such hold could be obtained by officers over their men as would ensure their remaining true to their duty, or even abstaining from personal outrage to their superiors.

The confidence, which the officers appear so generally to have placed in the good feeling of their men, has been proclaimed as irrefragable proof that they had done nothing to excite their dislike. But without intending to pass unqualified censure on those unfortunate gentlemen, I apprehend that such an argument

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In Canon Row we might have the energy, and promptness, to be expected from a single directing mind. I say *might*, because, unhappily, the "elegant impostor," who presides there, serves only to demonstrate, that in one small foppish priggish mind may be concentrated all the infirmity of purpose, the solemn trifling and fooling, the procrastination, hesitation, vacillation — in fine, everything objectionable, that could be found among any eighteen Directors, without their experience. I have heard on pretty good authority, that Mr. Smith has been displaying some highly characteristic traits. One is related of his having decided on cutting down by one half, an indent for four brass padlocks required for the Government House at Calcutta — though the Court of Directors had already deliberated on this important subject, and unanimously agreed to allow "our G. G." all four. Another is told of his having refused to sanction the payment of passage to India for officers detained here after September — and this in the face of the representation made by the Court, that some of those gentlemen have been detained, because they did not reach England till after the first batch of officers had been ordered out — that Government did not for six weeks thereafter come to a decision as to sending out any more — and that *then* the steamers were full for I know not how long to come. Well might Lord Ellenborough say, that Mr. V. Smith is distrusted by Indian officers. I commend him to the tender mercies of *Punch*, who might turn these wretched padlocks, and the yet more wretched "locksmith," to some use in amusing the public.

cannot be adduced as proving anything in their favour further than that they could have done nothing for which they deserved to get their throats cut. It would be perfectly natural, whether such cases occurred or not, that an officer, who had habitually treated his Sepoys with contemptuous neglect, or even harshness, should really labour under the hallucination that he was very much liked by them. Nay, the folly and blindness, that had hitherto directed his course, would be more likely than not to carry him on to the absurdity of expecting from them the utmost devotion in his hour of need; and he would probably not be one whit less surprised and shocked at their supposed want of gratitude, than he would be if he had established the most unquestionable claims upon it. The mere exhibition of confidence, in whatever degree, simply proves nothing.

In the first place, then, I would observe that (while the Sepoys were habitually treated in a highly objectionable manner, by a large number of officers) a far larger proportion have owed their lives to the good feelings of comparatively well-disposed men, than have fallen victims to a misplaced, though justifiable, confidence in them. Again, while every instance of such good conduct on the part of the Sepoys directly supports my assertion (that they may be rendered susceptible to those influences, which a kind and considerate treatment should create), I do not think, that the cases of proved misconduct on their part bear as strongly against my argument. The fidelity can be accounted for only in one way, the villany may have been influenced by a variety of causes.

The best of officers cannot be intimately acquainted with more than a tenth part of the men of his regiment—the remaining nine-tenths, therefore, cannot be directly influenced by him. Blackguards, too, of course, there are in the best companies; and the love of these men is not to be gained by the severity, ne-

cessary for controlling them. The influence of one or two good officers will not only be weakened, but often quite neutralised, by the inefficiency or misconduct of others: in a strife of race against race this is most especially the case. The influence of two or three good companies, in which there is a large proportion of well-disposed men, is lost in that of the remaining seven or eight chiefly containing bad ones; and thus, too, we see that corps (comparatively good regiments some of them), after holding out for a time against the evil influences that surrounded them, have eventually succumbed to them. Without positive proof, I could never believe that the Sepoys generally have taken an active part, in such atrocities as are recorded of them; but that they have, in some instances, actively engaged in them, and have, in very many instances, passively acquiesced in them, I fear is indisputable. We might well think that nothing could be more atrocious than this, did we not actually find a more monstrous villany to impute to them.

I have no object in defending any misconduct of the Sepoys; and, in regard to the brutal outrages we have heard of, I do not think it proves my feeling less strong, that I would be content with nothing short of the most rigid investigation into every such case, and a peculiar and fearful retribution on the monsters implicated,—instead of an indiscriminate severity on all. Meantime we will best effect our object, by entering into a calm consideration of the events as they have occurred; and here, I think, we will find little to warrant our surprise, however much there be to excite our horror, and disgust.

In every great commotion, we find the scum and dregs of society occupying the most prominent position. As revolutionists, these must necessarily be noisy, and violent; and, by their first step, they have risked the only stake they had—their lives. The very disposition, which makes the other party well

affected, impairs the value of their support, in rendering them also averse to action; and thus, from the outset, a contemptible minority continually gathers strength by its own excesses, and virulence. Released from all restraint, the wickedness of each miscreant stimulates that of the other, till, maddened by crime, their state becomes precisely that of infuriated lunatics.

Looking to what may be called the anatomy of cruelty, we will find it pervading human nature far more generally than is supposed; that, where little suspected, it is developed in various degrees, simply according to circumstances; and that it is one of those vices of which the *ne plus ultra* may easily be attained, and has so been reached by hundreds of millions, of all nations, creeds, and tongues. For example, as far as concerns sympathy for human suffering, the French Revolutionists would not have scrupled to perpetrate any of the atrocities, which have been witnessed in India; and, so far, then, nothing has occurred, but what might naturally have been expected under certain given circumstances. Now what, in this instance, are the plain, unvarnished facts of the case.

In the Bengal army, the proportion of natives to Europeans is about 25 to 1. In native regiments it is about 100 to 1—the European officer. Among the natives themselves, the Hindoos are to Mahomedans as about 10 to 1. The Hindoos, with some good points, are the votaries of a beastly and degrading heathenism, whose single merit is in being so absurdly contradictory, that while it shows divine authority (in precept, and example) for every crime that can disgrace humanity, enjoins also some good works, in addition to the jumble of childish, or disgusting observances, which it declares to be necessary to salvation.

As they can admit no proselytes, and—absurd

though it may seem—really believe all religions to be true, they are tolerant. As they have always been in subjection, they are submissive: but, when roused by any violence (real or supposed) to their idiotical rules of caste, they will resist to the death, and with all the frenzy of incarnate fiends.

The Mahomedans, in India little less idolatrous and absurd than the Hindoos, are in every respect more dangerous. They have a lost sovereignty to regain, and an intolerant and persecuting faith to re-establish; they are, therefore, ever anxious to effect our overthrow, and are very often plotting it.

To manage people of a disposition so ticklish, we have a set of men, whose ignorance and infatuation have been illustrated by this fresh act of folly; which supposed that Hindoo or Mussulman would be indifferent to tasting hog's lard!

There wanted not influential and discontented Mahomedans to turn the blunder to the furtherance of their ever cherished hopes; and while Government went on dismissing all who refused to use the cartridges, they spread the belief throughout India, that these men were punished for refusing to be made Christians.

In this state of affairs, the imbecility of one of those nonentities, whom our rulers delight to honor, whom our wretched system exalts to high authority in the land, brought matters to a climax. Some 80 troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, at Meerut, were sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for their contumacy in refusing the cartridges; but it, of course, never occurred to *such* a general, that this might produce excitement, which demanded any extra precaution. The remaining troopers, and the men of the other native regiments, were allowed the amplest facilities for plotting and conspiring to obtain redress. The few who did not believe in the hog's lard were the intriguing Mahomedans, who were turning the affair

to their own purposes. They primed themselves with bhang, and, drunken and infuriated, rushed out to the bloody work of exterminating the infidels. Their fury lighted up a flame throughout the whole native force, already excited and distrustful. The rest we know: the worst villains (many of them, probably, miscreants from the bazaar) did the work of murder; but all found themselves thus committed as accessaries, and felt they had hardly any alternative but in rebellion. Before them was the opportunity of revenging a supposed wrong; there was the hope of plunder, and there was security for their faith. In retracing their steps, they could see only courts martial, and hard labour, or, at best, religious degradation and excommunication.

All this was going on under the nose of a noodle, who had at hand a European force, more than sufficient to have crushed and annihilated double the number of those rebels; but he did nothing. He was at his wits' end, if I may use an expression that would suppose even a modicum of intelligence; and the whole body, unmolested, set out to re-enact, with additional horrors, the same bloody scene in Delhi.

In Delhi we have carefully maintained an idiotical pageantry, as if for the very purpose of perpetuating the hope of Islam, in the ultimate restoration of Mahomedan rule, in all its ancient splendour. And admirably has Delhi (with its rascally puppet king) served as a nucleus for the rebellion, from which emissaries have been despatched throughout the land, to blow into a flame the disaffection and distrust everywhere existing.

Having effected the largest possible amount of mischief, by their obstinacy in forcing these cartridges on the army, the officials next published a proclamation announcing their withdrawal; which then, of course, was regarded only as a tacit admission, that the cartridges really were of the objectionable cha-

racter supposed; and the injustice done to the dismissed Sepoys, and to the troopers punished as felons, was, of course, considered triumphantly established.

The entire native soldiery appear to have been thus tampered with; and, adjured by regard to that which they hold dearer than their honor, their money, their families, or life itself, it is not wonderful that so few have remained true to their salt—to the service of the stranger, whose intentions they would, under all the circumstances of the case, have good cause for doubting.

All that has occurred, tends to confirm the opinion that I have always held on two points:—

1st. That no conspiracy against us will ever obtain the general support of Hindoos, that is not framed on the pretext of averting an injury done to their caste or religious prejudices; and,

2ndly. That no general conspiracy can ever long continue concealed.

The first of these points is shown, in the *rationale* I have given of the plot; and it is clear, that energy, and judgment, on the part of our rulers, would have averted or crushed the danger; and that, had the regimental officers generally possessed ordinary influence with their men, their explanations would have been received, in preference to the distorted colouring given to the matter by Mahomedan scoundrels.

The second point is confirmed by the fact, that the mutiny did break out prematurely; for I feel very certain that there was no conspiracy among regiments, previous to the disbandment of the 19th Native Infantry.

As there was hardly a regiment in which the mutiny was universal, had there been a plot long in agitation, it would surely have been known, and revealed, by the men who resisted it to the last, at the peril of their personal safety, and sacrifice of their property. Those men, as we learn, included some of

the most intelligent and respectable native officers, and non-commissioned officers, in the corps, both Hindoo and Mussulman. They were men in whom the officers had always placed implicit—and, I am happy to find, a well-grounded—confidence; and it would really be absurd to suppose, that having determined to take their stand by us, they should have kept us ignorant of the plot for their and our ruin.

The mutiny in some regiments further confirms what I have said, as to the evil of inefficient regimental officers. I could mention several which appear to have been commanded by men who, if not greatly changed, were as unfitted by character, or temper, or both, for such trusts, as men well could be; and had, besides, some officers who would be a disgrace to any service: yet these corps remained faithful for a certain time, notwithstanding the evil influences which surrounded them. There is, therefore, *primâ facie* proof that, if a corps remained faithful so long under the command of a man hated, and despised, it would have continued to do so still longer under one respected, and beloved; and the importance of time, in affairs such as these, cannot be too highly estimated. Each fresh defection, of course, induces defection in others: the proofs given of the wide-spread distrust of government intentions, could not fail to be considered as some proof, also, that the distrust was well-grounded. If it has been unavoidable, that the Hindoos have remained the slaves of a beastly and unreasoning superstition, we must neither judge them by the light of Christianity, nor feel surprised at their being so little amenable to reason.

Some one—I now forget who—has expressed surprise, at the small amount of wisdom required in governing an empire; but, in considering events as they have been brought about in India, I am struck rather with the converse of the proposition — how

much folly it requires to ruin an empire! All the ingenuity, displayed in a long series of blunders, and absurdities, would, after all, have failed in securing the total alienation of our native army, had the system but neglected to ensure the inefficiency of its European officers. Here too, however, red tape and routine triumphantly carried their point, and the result of the labour we see.

When government systematically treated regimental officers with contemptuous neglect, officers ceased to interest themselves very particularly in their regimental duties; and Sepoys began to care as little for their regimental officers, as the officers cared for them. I dispute not, that it would have been more creditable, both to officers and men, had they been superior to such considerations as appear to have directed their sense of what was right; but the sentiment is by no means a new one, being very broadly set forth in the highly popular ballad of the *Jolly Miller;* and what I propose to show is, that the estrangement originated with the government, which ought to have remembered the maxim—*Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum tibi ipsi.*

A time there was, when officers generally possessed unbounded influence over their men, and among those simple, ignorant creatures really were what they figuratively call *ma-bap* (mother and father). It was an influence easily enough acquired then, though rarely met with now; and was independent of the possession of much ability, or of any moral worth. The semi-Hindooised men of the old school, who lived and talked like natives, liked their society, half believed in their gods, indulged in zenanas, delighted in nautches, rewarded and punished unsparingly, and were invested with such powers as are really necessary in governing natives, were liked and respected immensely, in spite of many acts of injustice, which they scrupled not to commit. Fear is,

indeed, a necessary ingredient in the feelings, with which natives should regard us; and we thus find them universally agreed, that those English were the men, whom the fates had in this *kala joog* (iron age) appointed to be their masters.

This state of things has passed away, and with it that pre-eminence of the European, which can never in such force be regained; but he might yet exercise a very efficient control, if inducement were held out for the exertion required, and some facilities were afforded in the task.

It is not necessary, for acquiring this influence, that officers should again become Hindooised; and immorality in the present day is rather prejudicial to it, especially when developed, as it now so generally is in India, in the form of reckless and dishonourable conduct; for whatever be the laxity of his own principles, the native has a horror of the European officer, who either cannot or will not fulfil his engagements.

To make the regimental officers really efficient, there are but two things required—to treat them with strict justice, and exact from them a rigid performance of their duty. Giving them what is their due, government can have no real difficulty, in insisting upon all that it is entitled to in return; but, showing no concern in regard to either point, the result that we find is only such as was inevitable.

While regiments continue the "Slough of Despond," for those having no interest — or say, no merit — to get removed to something better; while they are made the penal settlement, to which government may remand those, who are found hopelessly unfit for the duties of the staff—or, worse still, for those whose misconduct as officers, or as gentlemen, is deemed worthy of some severe mark of its displeasure; if escape from regimental duty remain the one great object of every officer's aspirations, and the dread of a remand to it the one bugbear that haunts him, and

damps his enjoyment of the much-coveted position he now occupies; if, moreover, regiments continue to be the nurseries for old field-officers to spend their time in, till they reach the goal of their ambition—the sinecure colonelcy; then must we expect the results which common-sense points out, and our experience has just confirmed. Officers will *not* interest themselves in duties, rendered doubly onerous by the addition of those of their brethren on the staff. They cannot have pride in serving a government which, pretending that it picks out only the best men for staff employment, virtually proclaims that the others are *refuse*, to whom a double share of unimportant duties may appropriately enough be left. On discontented men, a hint that little is expected from them, is not likely to be thrown away. While young in the service, they may continue to hope that something may yet turn up; and, according to their temperament, persevere in plaguing every influential big-wig on whose consideration they may have claims, real, or imaginary, or whose pity they may hope to move through their respective relatives — to the thirteenth cousin thrice removed, should they be Scotch, especially if a Scotch marquis be on the throne. But as these hopes have all reference to transfer to another position, it is not likely that they will inspire much zest for the duties, which the delay imposes; and, to the non-official mind at least, it does not appear probable, that an officer's interest in his men will increase, in proportion to the nearness of his prospect of leaving them for ever.

Men there are so charitable, that they can see nothing objectionable in the way patronage is bestowed in England—nay, are struck with admiration at the extreme disinterestedness, the strict attention to merit, and that alone, which guides our public men, and enables them always to put the right man in the right place. Such men would probably discover as

much to admire in the like disinterestedness of officials in India, where, also, there however prevails a very wide-spread, though not perhaps more deserved, distrust of official purity. We lately discovered that the splendid qualities of a Dowb could not have ensured Dowb himself from languishing in comparative obscurity, had he not been blessed with an uncle, who was fortunately in a position to make them better known, or appreciated, than they appear to have been by the general, under whose very nose they had been exhibited: otherwise, how can we suppose that the virtuous Panmure would have thought it necessary to interpose, at the risk of a charge of nepotism under which he now so unjustly suffers. *Dowbism*—it may now be considered a household word—has done much injury even in India. A real Dowb may, on some occasions, have his real merit rewarded through the system; but, as not one in ten thousand will ever believe that the main point is to have the merit, rather than the influential uncle to reward it, we shall always find, there also, that most dependence will be placed on what are esteemed the most likely means of advancement. The system demoralizes by leading to a great deal of jobbery, intriguing, and toadying; but it certainly never could lead a man to feel pride or pleasure in his regimental duties, or form an incentive to a faithful and conscientious discharge of them. I do not, however, believe that jobbery is so common as is generally supposed; that is, I believe, men in always providing themselves, their relatives, or their friends with the best berths they can obtain, generally fancy that they deserve them: this is only human nature, the practical result is the same, since private feeling overpowers and blinds the judgment. But I question very much whether anything is gained in purity, by substituting one lot of dispensers of patronage for another: what I find fault with, is the pretension of being insensible to anything but the

public good: the only remedy that I know of, is to circumscribe the limits of patronage as far as possible.

The real grievance that officers left with their regiments have to complain of is, not that they have not got staff appointments (they might as well feel discontented at not having been lords with their thousands per annum) but that, not having the grand luck to get out of the regiment, they cannot even get all the little luck that is in it.

The disgust is not felt, merely at seeing the fool and the knave so often preferred to a high position in India; it is because those left in the corps are obliged to do the work of that fool and knave, while he retains his position in their regiment, to the prejudice of their advancement.

The position of regimental officers, as contrasted with that of their brethren on the staff, would be sufficiently disadvantageous under any circumstances. Their pay (though pretty good for military men) is, for many years, no more than is sufficient, with very strict economy, to maintain them respectably; it therefore affords no equivalent for banishment to a country, so distant and so uncongenial to Europeans. The gross pay of an ensign per month is about £20, of a lieutenant £25 10*s*., and of a captain £41 10*s*., with an addition of £5* for a company, if holding one: while there is hardly a staff appointment to which an officer can be removed, which would not, at outset, nearly double his pay if a subaltern, or at the least equalise it with that of a captain.

Comparatively small as are all regimental allowances, they are never increased on account of extra work performed. Nominally there are 16 subalterns borne on the rolls of a regiment, of whom about 5 on the average (exclusive of adjutant and quarter-master) are actually present, and as many more on staff employ. But if, as I have known occur, there were but

* About £3 14s., after deducting unavoidable expenses.

two present, and each had to do the work of half-a-dozen, whether this were the wearisome routine duty of the station, or worse one of those treasure escorts, or commands, of which the authorities always manage to contrive a few throughout the hot winds, and rains, he would not receive any extra pay for his extra trouble, or even for his extra expence.

Staff officers, on the other hand, invariably draw extra pay for the extra duty of any other office which may be imposed on them; and they do so, moreover, even when the duty of one of those offices becomes merely nominal.

Again, officers on staff employ are usually retained permanently, or for many years at one station, where they have the means of making themselves very comfortable, at a very small expense. Regimental officers can never feel secure of remaining any time at a station, and are put to immense expense by the constant changes made. For such not one farthing of compensation is allowed, or even for losses — such as the value of their houses, in cantonments which the government thinks proper to abandon; or for depreciation of that property, by government reducing to a half or a third the contingent of troops there: regimental pay and allowances are supposed to be so large, as to enable the officer to meet every contingent expense which he may so incur.

European articles form a considerable item in an officer's expenditure, and are of course cheaper near the presidency, than at remote stations. Taking beer —a necessary of life in such a climate—as an example, it cost 4 to 5 rupees per dozen down country, and about 7 to 8 rupees at what were remote stations, when government introduced the measure of deducting 15 per cent from the "regimental pay of officers stationed within 200 miles of Calcutta." Since then our frontier has been extended to Peshawur, where beer costs from 12 to 14 rupees per dozen: but while

the half batta rule is preserved down country, no compensation is allowed to regimental officers, for the extra expense they incur through this extension of territory; though, besides, they were put to very great additional expense, in building houses throughout the Punjab. Staff allowances, on the other hand, are, in very few, if in any cases, affected by the half batta rule, and are calculated on a scale that compensates for extra expenditure.

On regimental officers is thrown the entire expense of supporting the character of the regiment in society. No staff officers ever think of bearing any share of this. They can *then* feel no interest in the corps. Government, which has little scruple in appropriating the cash of its officers, however chary it may be in meddling with that of the men, coolly ordered deductions for the support of bands to be made from the regimental allowances of all officers; but staff pay was left untouched. Thus men, in receipt of allowances exceeding those of a lieutenant-colonel, may pay no more than the captain, who does the duty of the two in the regiment.

Regimental promotion is slow and uncertain. The average service as ensign may be from 4 to 5 years, and I have known extreme cases of 12 to 14. The average service as subaltern is 16 to 17 years, and there are numerous cases of from 20 to 24 years. A majority is not usually attained in less than 30 years, and may take 3 or 4 longer. About 6 years more are required for a lieutenant-colonelcy, and 10 more added to that for a full colonelcy.

It is, after all, but a poor service, I think, that offers no better fortune than this—it certainly is very miserable, as compared with that of the staff officers', whose promotion in their departments is not only far quicker on the average, but of incomparably greater advantage to them, on account of the far higher ratio in which their allowances are increased thereby.

Surely this might suffice for them. But no—the spirit of wisdom, and of fairness, that directs Indian affairs, decrees that it shall be otherwise. Not only must these meritorious gentlemen enjoy all those separate and superior advantages, but they must have, too, a full share of what little may be going in a regiment, with which they have no connexion, but what is merely nominal.

I speak from the experience, I acquired in India as a regimental officer, when I say that all we may know of any particular man on the staff is, that being above us in the army list, he must always be promoted first, and stand in our way. So, after doing his duty for him for about a quarter of a century, we may be considered lucky if we can induce him to accept £2,000 or £3,000 to retire, and thus get rid of the incubus at last.

Not unfrequently it happens, that these men would gain so little by promotion, that they refuse to pay anything towards the purchase of steps; and some are so mean as to decline, in the hope that regimental officers will make good the deficit out of their own pockets, rather than lose the step. I have a feeling recollection, even now, of having (while an ensign on £20 a month) had to contribute towards purchasing the captaincy of a fellow on the staff, who was at the time in the receipt of £100 per month.

Often, when a corps is ordered on service, or to some pestilential district, these men are allowed to remain snugly in their appointments, gaining steps by the casualties occurring in *their* regiment, as it is called. Several men in my late regiment have gained advancement in this way. But it hardly mends matters to order them to join; for, having been so many years in entirely different employment, they come but to displace men experienced in matters of which they are profoundly ignorant; to say nothing of their being entire strangers to the men.

It often happens, that a man after being twenty or thirty years on staff employ—say Civil, or Commissariat, or something equally foreign to his duty as a soldier—has to return to his regiment (perhaps because promoted to a majority, or lieutenant-colonelcy, or it may be as a punishment for some gross misconduct), and thereupon supersedes some old officer in the command, to which that man had been looking forward for many years, as the only good thing, which one having no interest could hope to get. But it would be an endless task to multiply the cases of gross wrong, which not only *may* occur, but which constantly *do* occur, through this idiotical system of granting a monopoly of all favor to a particular class. Were government to declare, they cared not whether regimental officers were disheartened, and disgusted, or not, we should, at least, have an intelligible expression of their feeling; but when they affect to ignore the existence of that discontent, and, in the midst of these unparalleled disasters, suppose that no part of the mischief could have arisen from such a cause—that officers continued zealous in the face of such discouragements—the infatuation does indeed seem hopeless, since it is proof against the clearest demonstration of cause, and effect.

If Sepoys have no right to complain of any direct breach of faith on the part of government, it may be attributed to the dangerous temper they have displayed, under the suspicion that anything of the kind was contemplated, rather than to any feeling of what fairness, and honor demand. The way in which government has, on numerous occasions, treated European officers, whom they considered safe objects for experimenting upon, incontestably proves this.

The recent virtual abolition of the Invalid Establishment—suggested, I believe, by my Lord Dalhousie—was a striking instance of the principle that

guides Leaden Hall. I have nothing to offer in defence of the folly that devised that establishment, or of the abuses which rendered it so severe a drain on the resources of the state. If government thought proper to hold out, among the other advantages it offered to its military officers, that of an establishment to which (on being invalided by a medical committee) they might retire, on a rate of pay little short of what they received while effective—if with the privilege they coupled the absurd condition, that the officer, though required to do no duty, must remain in India, choosing any part of the country he liked best—officers are responsible neither for the extravagance, nor the absurdity. However foolishly the government may have acted in devising such a scheme for invalid officers, I for one, though I care not personally about it, protest against this new breach of faith in withdrawing the benefit. When government can restore to the officer his youth, the years he has spent in their service, and his constitution as it was before he proceeded to that accursed country, then may they reasonably and fairly tell him, that if he do not like their service, he may leave it; but till they can do this, he is entitled to every advantage offered to induce him to accept it. Of course, in some measure, right is might, in this world; and the injury I speak of I do not expect to see redressed, simply because I know that officers have no might on their side. The disgust, however, that such doings excite reacts injuriously on the public welfare.

The wrong here done was sustained exclusively by the class performing regimental duty, for, in the course of many years' service, I do not remember a single instance of an officer on the staff applying for transfer to the Invalid Establishment. That numbers of them were fit for nothing else, does not affect the question, for, practically, it was left entirely optional, to invalid or to remain in the service—nominally

doing duty, but really as entirely useless to the state, perhaps more so.

It is, of course, open to the discretion of any government to fix any rate of remuneration it pleases for new comers; and if as good men could be had at half the pay now given, it would be folly to continue to such the present high rates; but however improvident the bargain, which may have been made with old servants, it is dishonesty to infringe one jot of their privileges. "Blessed," says the psalmist, "is he that sweareth to his own hurt and *changeth not*."

However small may the encouragement for zeal in the service be found by regimental officers, they have little to complain of on the score of restricted licence to behave as blackguards.

A certain amount of risk of dismissal is no doubt incurred in getting drunk when on duty; but this severity is amply compensated by the impunity with which any one may, on all other occasions, make a beast of himself, when the spirit moves him. The dismissals for drunkenness, numerous as they are, do but form the exceptional cases, in proving the prevalence of this vice; and for one man dismissed for being drunk, at the inopportune moment when his services are required, ten are suffered to remain, whose well-known habits render them untrustworthy for any duty.

Gambling is against the regulations, but this only means, that officers are not offensively to obtrude on the notice of the authorities their propensity to this vice. Of what would be considered "offensive obtrusion," we may negatively form some idea by what, at Simla—the Baden-Baden of India—goes on under the noses of successive Commanders-in-Chief, and does *not* disturb their minds. Probably nothing short of a sworn information would satisfy them of the existence of what is notorious to all.

Brigadiers, and commandants of regiments in the

plains, have the same scruples against interference with such recreations; and numbers of young officers are ruined, by the absence of all check on indulging therein. As is said to be generally the case in England, these gamblers, commencing as pigeons end in becoming rooks. A considerable number make gambling the great business of their lives; and, by the skill which they have acquired (if not occasionally by yet more discreditable means) draw from the pockets of the inexperienced an income, compared with which that derived from their profession is of small importance. There is one well known case, of an officer who was enabled to retire on a fortune of 150,000 rupees, the fruits of the skill, which incessant practice had given him. If there are few cases of such competencies being thus realised, it must be remembered, that gambling leads to other expensive habits; and gains so acquired are usually expended on immediate enjoyment; while of the misery brought on the losing party there is the clearest manifestation.

As indulgence in this vice rarely fails to destroy right moral perceptions, it is not surprising that we find so many men playing on the principle, that if they win they may receive some cash—if they lose they can settle everything by an I.O.U., which they never mean to take up. I have seen subalterns coolly sit down to play short whist at gold mohur points, (=32s.) when they well knew that all their estate, real or personal, with their credit to boot, would not suffice to meet the losses they might incur in a couple of hours of such amusement. I do not mean to say, that some such men may not have some vague sense of the obligation of a debt of honor, even while they scorn the legitimate claims of their tailors; but the result, when any is obtained, is usually this, that the holder of the I.O.U. must be satisfied with his friend's real wish that he could meet it, while the

detested Snip secures the reluctant liquidation of his bill, by the intervention of the Court of Requests.

Debt is another of those indulgences into which the Indian Government permits regimental officers to plunge, to the deepest extent that their ingenuity can contrive; while it imposes on staff officers the limit of stopping short of an appearance in the Insolvent Court, under the penalty of being reduced to the position of mere regimental officers, the class to whom the privilege of a whitewash is restricted.

Obvious, indeed, is the policy of limiting the indulgence to that class, since the staff officers often have the power of relieving their necessities in the only way government considers objectionable; and so alarming a proof of impecuniosity suggests grave doubts of the safety of the till under such a trial. But a regimental officer can do no such mischief as the government feels any great concern about; and we have several distinguished men of that class, who have endured incarceration, the pain of which must have been much soothed by reflecting on the considerate kindness of their masters, in allowing the weary time so passed to count as service for pension; and in permitting them, when duly whitewashed, to return to the bosom of their regiment—(in official parlance)—"without prejudice to their rank"—prejudices as to character, of course, government is quite free from!

I think I form a very moderate estimate of the extent of the evil, in supposing that three-fourths of all the regimental officers are pretty deeply involved in debt. The enormous number of claims every month brought before Courts of Requests in every cantonment in India, and the fact that in nearly every case the verdict is for the plaintiff, fully bears out this estimate, when we consider further that these claims represent only sums under 400 rupees. The comparative paltriness of the sums, for which they

are so often cast, proves the depth of the embarrassments of the officers, and how little self-respect they can have, when they incur an exposure so degrading; but this is merely the ordinary part of the business, and to have awards made against future pay, for many months to come, is what hundreds of officers have allowed themselves to be subjected to, for many years, without feeling the slightest shame about the matter. Still worse cases occur, and an officer often has execution-general given against him; and many submit periodically to the process, with the greatest composure.

As the authorities never feel called upon to take any notice of such matters, we must wonder at the credulity which continues to trust men who have for years rendered themselves infamous, by habitual breaches of their engagements, rather than be surprised that such men should avail themselves of it, to obtain goods on what—if we call things by their right names—*are false pretences.*

Officers, who consider the immediate gratification of all their propensities as an object paramount to every consideration of the means which must be resorted to, where their circumstances cannot afford this, have additional facilities for getting into debt, through a set of banks, established on the philanthropic pretext of rescuing them from the clutches of native usurers. The business mainly carried on by these establishments is very analogous to that of a class of men at home, who are generally of the Hebrew persuasion, and who are ready to accommodate fast men on the strength of the expectations they have outrun. The securities of these banks are the debtor's position in the service, and a bond for repayment by instalments from his future pay, together with a life insurance. They further require the securityship of two or three other officers, as parties to the same bond and conditions.

To a young subaltern, the idea of getting a sum of a couple of thousand rupees or so all at once, to pay off old debts and dash about a little longer, is really quite charming; and he cannot then, though he does afterwards, see the evils, which such a loan (at some 12 to 14 per cent. interest and charges, compounded half-yearly) may bring upon him. Many a man dates his ruin from the first interview with one of these bank secretaries; and well may he do so, when, to procure present gratification, he pledges his means of subsistence (by no means superfluously large) for years to come. It is no uncommon thing to see half a dozen young officers in a corps, each severally indebted to these banks some 3,000 or 4,000 rupees, and severally security for each of the others, to this tune.

Few men can long retain nice sentiments of honour under the pressure of pecuniary difficulties, brought on by their own extravagance; and as it is too notorious to be denied, that Indian regimental officers are very generally in debt, it is not surprising that the general conduct of so many of these is most disreputable. It is obviously impossible for me to set down names, or to record the misconduct of the many blackguards I have met; but I can appeal to every officer in the service to say, whether he has any difficulty in recalling many such names, and whether he has not known instances of such persons pursuing, with perfect impunity, for many years a course of unblushing rascality and falsehood. I trust and believe that we have a large number of officers of the highest honour, and I think none of these have any wish to blink the question; and that they deeply deplore the fact, that, through the apathy of the government, and the imbecility of those placed in important commands, officers may, and do, persevere in courses which here would conduct them to a reformatory course of penal discipline. Officers

such as these not only never can have proper influence over the Sepoys, but must, in a great measure, prevent good officers in the same regiment from having any.

If we have a re-organisation of our entire system, and give to regimental officers what is their due—what will enable them to feel that confidence is really placed in their good qualities, and that importance is attached to their efficiency, there can be little difficulty in securing men who will give such satisfaction. Real responsibility should be imposed on all placed in authority, by inflicting on *them* the punishment which would be due for the offence they concealed.

The man who overlooked a case of drunkenness should himself be removed from the service; he is really as untrustworthy as the drunkard is.

The man who overlooked dishonourable conduct in one acting under his authority, should himself be cashiered, for he proves that he is deficient in right moral perceptions.

We do not want goodnatured old women, but men (where duty or honour is concerned) of unbending sternness.

The treatment of junior officers should be on the same principle. While men can be obtained who do not drink, or lie, or cheat, or get into debt, it would be folly to retain any who are known to have such propensities. With regard to debt, there might appear to be a necessity for a less summary proceeding; but a general principle might be laid down, which could be acted upon practically. We cannot define in words an exact rule on the subject, but we could form a correct opinion on any case submitted; and where a man was found guilty of incurring obligations, which he had not a reasonable prospect of being able to perform, this would be dishonourable conduct, which there need be no room for hesitation in punishing with dismissal. But we might safely go a step

further and lay down a rule, that a man who, within a certain period of time, had a certain number of awards given against him by a Court of Requests (unless they certified that the defence appeared to have originated in a misapprehension as to liability), should thereupon be removed from the service.

I cannot see what hardship there would be in this, and the good effect it would have on morality is indisputable. I never had an award against me, from the first day I entered the service, though entirely dependent on my regimental pay; and there are hundreds of other officers in Bengal, who can say the same. Why, then, should not all be able to say so? Simply because the government has never cared a straw about the matter, and has given them unlimited license to ruin themselves if they chose.

The government that respects its officers, and gives them their due, has made the first step towards making them respect themselves, and render faithful service to their employers.

I know not whether the late Sir Charles Napier proposed any sweeping measures for restoring the tone of feeling in the officers, and improving the discipline of the men, in the Bengal army; but it is very notorious, that he was deeply impressed with the evils he saw in both. The feeling against him, in high quarters, was much too strong to allow of his carrying out any great measure of reform; but I presume that no one will deny his competency to pronounce an opinion on military subjects: no one will, I think, venture to say, that he could not see what constituted the difference between regiments of good soldiers, and regiments of careless, slovenly, ill-drilled, and worse-disciplined fellows—such as he declared many of our Bengal corps to be, and such as they continued up to the time of their mutiny.

Sir Charles Napier is, I know, believed to have

latterly conceived a prejudice to Bengal officers, from the fact of there being so many notorious black sheep among them. With the limited means at his command, it was impossible for him to have weeded out more of these than he did; and, remembering how *pitch defileth*, I am not surprised that he should have considered the general tone of feeling lowered (as, indeed, it was) by the contaminating presence of such men.

By way of illustration, I could name an officer who has, with perfect impunity, for fourteen years, pursued a course of unblushing rascality—who once, by deliberate falsehood, inveigled two of his brother officers into becoming his sureties for large sums—who has systematically swindled tradesmen, and had his debts compromised by a trifle in the rupee—who has bought goods on credit, to sell again for cash—who never missed appearing before the monthly Court of Requests, except just after some *exposè* that, for the time, rendered even his unblushing effrontery powerless for obtaining anything on credit — who made a practice of employing the men of his company to obtain loans for him; and not only borrowed from the men themselves, but even from one of the regimental sweepers—who was ordinarily spoken of as "that horrid scoundrel ——" and who yet was associated with by several of his brother officers, whose own personal character was irreproachable. To complete the sketch, I may add, that that officer held an important command at the time of the outbreak, and had the opportunity of showing how little influence such a fellow could have over his men. I give no clue to the identification of that man, when there are so many of the same feather; but, painful as it is to proclaim that there are such men in our army, far more painful is it to remain quiet under such a humiliation. Men as bad as the above instanced might (I have every reason to believe), be found in the Bombay

and Madras armies, in fully as great numbers as in that of Bengal. But I do the officers of the Queen's service only strict justice when I say, that it would be impossible to find such among them. A blackguard in one of Her Majesty's regiments has a very short career; and I do not see why he should continue any longer in one of the Indian army.*

Open insubordination towards European officers—apart from a general mutiny—is, as far as I am aware, utterly unknown in the Bengal army; and the force of the officer's own good example, has but rarely failed in securing similar attention to every duty, on the part of the native soldier; but to gain his affection, he must be treated as a humble friend, or as a child, for such in intellect he really is. There need be no bounds to indulgence, but the obvious

* Not to crowd my text with examples (which might be almost indefinitely multiplied) of black sheep in the Bengal army, I here present some account of a brother officer of the above noted worthy.

Perhaps by the attractions of a countenance, which—adverting to the gloomy prospects of Indian officers—may yet very probably gain him a comfortable livelihood, in sitting as a model of the Judas Iscariot type, he was enabled to acquire his first notoriety by embittering the last days of a dying man, with whose worthless wife he carried on an intrigue. But the gallant Lieutenant had an eye to profit as well as to pleasure, and the mysterious disappearance of his victim's silver spoons—which the Committee of Adjustment vainly sought for among the effects they had to dispose of for the benefit of the unfortunate children, not less than of the adulterous mother—was in due time cleared up by these being displayed at Iscariot's table, which, I hear, they have continued to garnish for the last dozen years. His course for a few years thereafter was as disreputable, as habits of lying, cheating, and gambling, occasional drunkenness and pretty frequent appearances at the Court of Requests could make it. It is now many years since he made a first approach to respectability in eschewing strong waters, and Courts of Requests; *i.e.*, he now meets every obligation, which his ingenuity in quibbling, or his effrontery in lying, does not enable him to back out of, shuffle out of, or openly repudiate. But thus far has he progressed, and no further is he likely to go: yet notorious and infamous as he has made himself, he can mix in the society of officers and gentlemen, against whose honor I know nothing, save that they submit to such contamination.

requirements of the service; and the one point on which reserve should be maintained between the Sepoy and his officer, is that which concerns his duty. A degree of affability, while off duty, which would probably destroy an officer's authority among any other troops, is indispensable to render it irresistible among natives; and a wretched joke will often have the most extraordinary effect in diverting their weak minds, under disappointment, hardship, or even what they consider injustice. A distant bearing, when not engaged on duty matters, would be fatal to any attempt to gain their esteem: it is so utterly repugnant to their notions of propriety, that they can view it only as a mark of dislike or contempt; and except among Calcutta baboos, I never knew or heard of any native presuming upon familiarity shown him. It may easily be imagined what intense bores men so childish and ignorant often are—how difficult it is to exhibit becoming interest in their rigmarole stories and absurd fancies; but patience under the infliction, will generally meet with its reward, in their esteem and gratitude.

It is not altogether, though it may partly be, a sycophantish feeling, that prompts the Sepoy, when off duty, to go and make his salaam to his officer, and bestow some of his tediousness upon him, without having any special reason to assign for the visit. He cannot, therefore, but feel deeply hurt when summarily dismissed, as he generally is, without a word of kindness or even civility, and often with some insulting observation as to his being a bore. Except while on detached command, there is hardly an officer in the service who sees anything of his men when off duty. The intimate acquaintance with Sepoy character to which I lay claim, has been acquired mainly through my having been so much on detachment duty, when I had little or no society but theirs. As I always preferred the solitude of outposts, when it relieved

me from subjection to such men as commanded my regiment, and as no one else cared to purchase the exemption at such a sacrifice, I have had very ample opportunities for forming correct opinions on the subject of which I speak.

I cannot pretend to say, that I have anticipated the course of events, just as they occurred; but I have always felt, that if we had to meet any serious disaffection on the part of the Sepoys, we should generally find that their officers had not that influence, which would suffice to bring them back to their duty. I feel equally sure, that any new attempt to officer regiments on the unfair system of which I complain, would lead to a like lamentable failure. A single officer who had no injustice to complain of, would render better service in making his regiment efficient, than the dozen of those discontented men, who were left to growl over their luck, and curse the favouritism and the injustice of the government.

I never heard of an objection suggested to a staff corps, except that of the expense it would involve: and this is simply a sample of those groundless assertions, that office-men keep cut and dry, as a clencher to an argument, without condescending to point out the application. Expense is the thing, of all others, that has no bearing whatever on the subject.

If we could yield our minds to the Hibernian fancy, that a man could be a bird and in two places at one time, we should, no doubt, be much struck with the advantage to be derived from having a man acting, say, as Commissariat officer in Calcutta, and as officer of the day with his regiment at Lahore. But would our power of imagining this, assist in leading us to the realisation of the fiction? For all practical purposes, the Commissariat officer in Calcutta can be of no use in his regiment at Lahore. Why, then, should we not strike him off? What does this cost? Merely the stroke of a pen! It is

begging the question, or rather it is entering upon a perfectly new and distinct question, viz. that of the paucity of officers, to say that we must supply his place. The fact is, he was but a myth; and the mere striking off his name, no more renders it necessary to add another regimental officer, than does the keeping his name in, obviate such necessity.

I feel it almost necessary to apologise, for offering any explanation of what is really so self-evident: but the obtuseness which has been shown in regard to this matter (clear as it appears) justifies the elaborate demonstration of what might be laid down as a postulate—*that to take nothing from anything, as much remains.* If it were even suggested, that the Commissariat officer, though as a general rule non-effective, might be made available, on an emergency, for regimental duty, I think the reply is equally obvious, that his own department always requires some one to attend to it, and no one is so fit for it as he himself, at least we ought to suppose so. If he is removed from what have become his legitimate duties, to perform (at a moment's notice) others which have become strange to him, government must still go to the expense of getting some one to perform his. However far down they may go, in promoting each to act for the man above him, they must, at last, come to the bottom, where a new man is required. They thus have to employ two inexperienced men: a new man is put in the Commissariat, where he may be kept almost long enough to be of some use; the Commissariat man is sent to join his regiment, for the purpose of performing duties, which he may have entirely forgotten, and which he is probably far too old to learn, even if the time so lost were no object.

If the Commissariat office objected to permanent transfer to the staff, I think no one could dispute the justice of allowing him to rejoin his regiment: but he could have no reason to complain of being restricted

to one, or other, of these positions; and it appears to me to be little short of insanity, to disgust a whole regiment, merely to humour still further an individual, whose position is already so far more advantageous.

I have taken a Commissariat officer for illustrating my subject; but, of course, any other staff officer would have done equally well; and, as far as I recollect, the appointment of aide de camp (which from its nature is temporary) is the only one, that need be regarded as an exceptive case. The various departments might severally be formed into corps of officials, and all take the chance of preferment, which these severally offered them. Honorary rank might be accorded to them in such ratio as they might have expected to have attained under the old system. Some short probation might be previously exacted, ere the final transfer to the department were made; but this, satisfactorily got through, there ought to be no further change: all would thus get their due, and staff officers, after all, would be incomparably better off than regimental officers.

If I had now the opportunity of being offered the alternative, I would (whatever were my regimental position) unhesitatingly sacrifice it, with every advantage it might afford me under the re-organisation I propose; and would accept staff employ, with my prospects restricted to my particular department, even if I only obtained an addition of 30 per cent to my allowances. Considering that the average difference between the pay of officers on the staff, and of regimental officers of a like standing is fully 60 per cent, I think there can be little doubt as to which would continue the favourite service.

These sentiments will be pronounced shockingly low and mercenary by many distinguished gentlemen, whose ample allowances place them above the necessity of solicitude as to trifling advantages; and who

affect to deplore, that their own too brilliant talents rendered it impossible for government to leave them to follow out the natural bent of their inclinations, all centred in a profession the earliest, the latest, the most cherished object of their affections. Indeed, this affectation of enthusiasm is carried to the extent, of tabooing to the mere militaire all considerations but those of honour, and glory: and their beau ideal of a regimental officer, if anything like what they would be in that position, is precisely the reverse of what they are, in their own present circumstances. However, these are not rare examples of those men, who everywhere generously offer to their *inferiors* the most exalted rules of honor for their guidance, while content with the basest practices for themselves.

Mixed motives practically work the best in this world; and the servant, who affected to care little for his own interests, might safely be charged with the worst designs in putting forth this palpable falsehood. What we want is to get men of honor, and sense, and prudence, not Quixotic knight-errants, whose proper place (if they existed at all) would be in Bedlam. The measure of redress I ask, small as it is, would, I think, generally satisfy regimental officers; and it would abate that unwholesome craving for staff employ, which depresses or unsettles the minds of all; while it would leave ample means to government of showing due encouragement to the whole race of Dowbs, present, and to come.

I cannot afford the space necessary for entering into the details, which would prove how badly the present system worked, in regard to the efficiency of those staff establishments, which are maintained at the expense of the best interests of the army. It will be sufficient to point to the departments of the Quarter-master-general, and of the Commissariat, as illustrations of all that could be said of extravagant expenditure, and of thorough uselessness.

The former department has, in every campaign, proved that no assistance whatever could be derived from it—it was, on every occasion, the laughing-stock of the army. The latter, in the exposé made on the celebrated Jotee Pershad trial, left no room to doubt its rotten state.

The government had the mortification of being compelled, by the Supreme Court, to pay the Lalla an enormous sum of money, because its officers had kept no check on that contractor; and were obliged to admit, that they really knew nothing about the justice of the claims he advanced—what had been, or what had not been supplied.

In urging that every officer on staff employ should be immediately struck off the strength of his regiment, I have distinctly stated that this in no way involves the necessity of maintaining, in each corps, the same number of effective officers, as it now numbers of effective, and non-effective combined. Doubtless it would be desirable to have a considerable number, in every regiment, of regulars; but, having secured, by the measure I propose, the efficiency (because the contentment) of those that remain with it, I think the mere question of number might, to a considerable degree, be regulated by the financial circumstances of the government.

At present there are, nominally, a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, 7 captains, 11 lieutenants, and 5 ensigns, in all 26 officers; and, as 7 of these are permitted, by the present regulations, to be permanently detached, there remain 18 officers who are supposed to be present with the colours—the colonel being always non-effective, i.e. as colonel a sinecurist. Supposing a native corps of the line to have 10 companies of 100 men each (with the usual complement of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers) it might be advisable to allot to it 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 10 captains, and 10 subalterns.

I do not pretend to attach any great importance to this apportionment; but I think it desirable, that the proportion of subalterns and captains should be so assimilated, as to allow of the latter rank being attained within a more reasonable time than it at present is. The superior position of a captain carries with it a weight, that amply repays government for the expenditure it occasions; and the encouragement that the chance of quicker promotion would give young officers, is an advantage that is not to be lightly estimated. With this view I would recommend, that every officer should be promoted to his lieutenancy after three years' service; and the proportion of ensigns and lieutenants, among the 10 subalterns, would thus fluctuate according to circumstances.

The useless, sinecure colonelcy, I propose to abolish altogether. It has been the bane of the service, in holding out an inducement for old and incapable officers to hang on, in the hope of obtaining this prize. I claim, of course, for all who have at this time attained the grade of regimental field officer, ample compensation for the injury they would incur; but, to all below that rank, the impetus given to promotion would make up for any remote advantages thus sacrificed. The saving which would accrue to government, of the allowances drawn by colonels, would, of itself, go far to meet the increased expenditure, arising from the modifications I have suggested.

The officers required for brigade and divisional commands, might be drawn from the field officers; and such rank be conferred, as was suitable for the command to which they were appointed. Retirement should be made compulsory, immediately on an officer's completing the thirty-two years' service, required to obtain the highest grade of pension. Retirement should further be made compulsory on the pension any officer was entitled to, if absent from his duty, by reason of ill health, for any period (or periods

combined) amounting to two years, counting from the date on which he could have claimed the pension.

I found these suggestions on the principle, that it is for the interest of Government to retain the services of officers, while they are comparatively young and vigorous; and to get rid of them when they become old. To hold out inducements for a man to remain thirty-two years, during the whole of which time (under ordinary circumstances) he may really be of value to the state; and then to dismiss him to an honourable competency. The proviso I would make, in the case of his getting sick, would avert the evil of being burdened with men, whose ailments might afford them the means of protracting the period of their service, where detriment to the public interests would be the only result. I think it would be highly objectionable to allow the government any discretionary power, in retaining the services (except in time of war) of any officer who had completed his period of thirty-two years' service. It is, at least, extremely probable, that equally able men could, at any time, be found among the juniors; and the pretence of "special cases," and "special claims," has too often been put forth in India, to cover jobbery and favouritism.

For a commander-in-chief, £8,000 per annum, consolidated allowances, would be a most handsome remuneration, since it suffices for a lieutenant-governor, officially his superior. For a general of division, £3,000 per annum, consolidated, would be proportionately ample; and for brigadiers of the first and second class, £2,500 and £2,000 respectively.

A large saving would be effected by these reductions; but a far greater advantage would be obtained, in having the posts filled by men comparatively young, and active; and in the modification of that fatal error, on which we have unhappily acted, of re-

serving all the sweets of the service for men, who have become incapable of giving any adequate return, or even of really enjoying the extravagant salaries they receive. Admirably has General Hewitt proved, that by thus paying a premium on senility, we effect an insurance in favour of rebellion.

The furlough regulations require to be entirely remodelled; and, considering the unfair advantage that has, on so many occasions, been taken of the helpless position of officers, something, I think, might not unreasonably be now expected in the way of indulgence; but I ask nothing for them, that is not based on obvious expediency.

The ponderous wisdom of Leaden Hall is ever in ludicrous disproportion to the result, achieved by its deliberations. The parturient mountains gave birth to nothing so insignificant, as those eighteen genltemen are delivered of, in the labour of ideas affecting great interests. The idiotical "Old Furlough Regulations," had, at least, the merit of clearness and perspicuity; there was, so to speak, *method in the madness.* The Honourable Court, in the effort to accommodate the folly to the present age of steam, has preserved it intact, while effectually destroying the precision. We have been presented with a complicated set of arrangements, the difficulty of understanding which is proved by the numerous references, made by the Indian Government, for further explanations. The value of the boon, that it was supposed the Court intended to confer, may be estimated by the fact, that so many regimental officers preferred remaining on the old footing. Even if not so intended, the benefit is really limited to staff officers, who can now return to England without loss of their appointments, and are thus, indeed, assured of them in perpetuity.

In the Queen's service, officers may obtain a great deal of leave, without any loss of service, or of pay except as regards colonial allowances; and I appre-

hend the indulgence has not been found prejudicial to the best interests of the state, albeit the country has derived no pecuniary benefit thereby.

To me, it appears that the view taken of the subject by the Horse Guards, is really the most sensible, and judicious; while the disposition ever manifested by the Court of Directors, to measure out the indulgence by the tape yard — to weigh, in scales of such scrupulous nicety, the penn'orth handed over — proves that this corporation, however admirably fitted for the position it originally occupied, is little suited for such a charge as the concerns of a great army.

Since no precise rule as to leave is laid down in the Queen's regulations, it is impossible to determine, with exactness, how much any officer might be able to obtain; but I speak, perhaps, within a safe margin, when I say, he might fairly calculate on getting, in the aggregate, one year in six. Admitting that, circumstanced as officers are in India, some definite rules on the subject are desirable, I think the indulgence, to the above-named extent, might be accorded with positive gain to the state. If each grant of leave were limited to one year, officers would have the benefit of periodically freshening both their minds and bodies, without incurring the risk of becoming rusted in their duty; and as all distinction might then be abolished between sick leave, and private leave, an inducement would be offered to avoid getting sick, which the army list can show to be much needed.

Where furloughs were so frequent, yet for such short periods, there could be no difficulty in regulating the distribution, so as to retain a certain fixed number of officers with the regiment; and, while the finances of the Government would be relieved by saving the Indian allowances of the absentees, an incomparably greater advantage would be gained, through the heartiness with which the

duty would be performed by those remaining, if cheered by a certain prospect of obtaining the indulgence in their turn.

Hitherto, the only result of the legislation on this subject has been, to make an immense number of people miserable, by keeping them stewing in India, injuring themselves, and doing no good to the state; with no apparent object, but to *consume* so much time — just as incipient barristers are required to eat so many terms.

"All work and no play, makes Jack a dull boy." But the Indian officer, whether he work or not, will become dull enough, if he has too much of India. A little common sense brought to bear on the subject, shows that it would be more judicious to force him to return occasionally to England, than to concoct a code of ingeniously devised restrictions on his doing so. If an equal amount of efficient superintendence can be kept up by a smaller number of the high-paid officers, the pecuniary gain is obvious. Unhappily, the desirableness of securing cheerfulness, and heartiness, among regimental officers, has never struck our authorities; they have been quite satisfied if they could keep them at regimental head-quarters: of the rest they seem to have despaired, and no doubt recollected that it was easy to bring the horse to the water, and presumed it was hopeless to try to make him drink.

The re-organization which I propose for the Bengal army, involves a large augmentation of the European portion, with a corresponding reduction in the native part of the force; so as to bring within a safe compass that disproportion, which nothing but the blindest infatuation could have allowed to increase so enormously as it has done.

By a return of the Indian government, it would

appear, that the proportion of European to native soldiers is, in Bombay, as 1 to $9\frac{2}{3}$; in Madras, 1 to $16\frac{2}{3}$; and in Bengal, 1 to $24\frac{2}{3}$! In estimating the comparative trustworthiness of the three armies, these figures are extremely significant, and suggestive; for we may not unfairly suppose, that Mahomedan intriguers confined their attentions to that army, in which the natives formed so overwhelming a majority.

Within the last twenty years,* the augmentation made in the native portion of the Bengal army, amounts to 24 regiments of cavalry, and 41 of infantry—all irregulars, and all officered by Europeans drawn from regiments of the line. Besides this, the native corps of the line have been strengthened, to the extent of some 20,000 men; while, as a counterpoise to this addition of at least 60,000 black troops, the European portion has been increased by 2 infantry regiments, or say a couple of thousand men! To Lord Dalhousie, I may remark, are we mainly indebted for this state of things. The superior cheapness of native soldiers, was a point not likely to escape his financial sagacity; and about three-fourths of this addition to their numbers was made by him.

In Madras, on the other hand, there has, within this period, been no addition whatever made to the native portion of the army, though 2 Company's European regiments have likewise been added to it, and the same to that of Bombay.

In Bombay, the augmentation in the native force amounts to but 3 corps of the line, 2 Belooch battalions, and some half-dozen local or police corps.

So much for the temptations severally endured by these armies.

I may here incidentally notice the injustice done

* Nearly the whole of this addition has however been made since 1846-7.

to the Bengal service, by the favouritism shown to that of Bombay, and (though in a less degree) to that of Madras, in the distribution of those new regiments of Europeans. The Bengal army being three times the size of the Bombay, and one-third larger than the Madras, it is obvious that, in giving a like augmentation to each, Bombay officers obtained three times the promotion that we got; and even the Madras men obtained one-third more. What makes the injustice more palpable, is the disproportion between the Queen's and the Company's European troops in these presidencies. While in Bengal there are no fewer than 15 Queen's regiments to the Company's 3, in Bombay there are but 4, and in Madras only 3 to the same proportion!

But another bit of favouritism was perpetrated, for the exclusive benefit of the Bombay army. It obtained an addition of 3 native regiments of the line, while its corps were being kept up at no greater strength than 800 privates (at which I believe they still are), whereas in Bengal, our regiments have been for many years maintained at a strength of 1,000 privates, and no augmentation has been allowed to us. If the government can suppose that this injustice did not excite deep disgust in the minds of Bengal officers, I can only marvel at their simplicity.

Exclusive of Queen's troops, artillery and sappers, the Bengal army is composed* of the following regiments:—

Europeans.	Natives.	
	Regulars	and Irregulars, Contingents, etc.
Inf^{y}, 3.	Cav^{y}, 10; Inf^{y}, 74.	Cav^{y}, 25; Inf^{y}, 45.

And for these I would substitute:—

Europeans.	Natives.	
	Regulars.	Irregulars.
Cav^{y}, 5; Inf^{y}, 15.	Inf^{y}, 50.	Cav^{y}, 15; Inf^{y} Pol. B^{ns}, 50.

* It may be as well to observe, that here, as in other places, I speak of things as they were previous to the disturbances.

The infantry police battalions (each of which might be raised to the strength of 1,000 men of all ranks) should perform all those miscellaneous duties with which, for so many years, the native regiments of the line have been harassed, and their discipline and general efficiency so seriously impaired. Though, of course, they would suffer from the like cause, they should, as far as possible, be regularly drilled, and disciplined; and in this respect, certainly, need not be much inferior to the regiments of the line under their present disadvantages. There would be no object in establishing regular reliefs for them; but they could be moved about as occasion really made necessary; and besides making themselves generally useful, they might be made to act with troops of the line, both in the field and in cantonments. As none but the best description of men should be taken, it would be advisable to place them, in regard to pay, on the same footing as the regular troops.

A commandant, second in command, and adjutant, would suffice to officer such a corps; and consolidated allowances of 1,000 rupees, 600 rupees, and 400 rupees per month, respectively, would afford ample inducement for able-enough men to accept of the permanent transfer to such appointments, obtaining promotion only in those corps.

The irregular cavalry regiments might remain as they are at present, except that their European officers should be permanently transferred to them, as in the case of the police corps. They should be relieved from all the degrading offices to which they are exposed, in performing civil duties; and, in fact, they should be irregulars merely in name — in not being officered to the extent that the regular cavalry corps of the line were.

As for the 10 regular native cavalry regiments, our disasters have not been altogether without be-

neficial uses, when they enable us to get rid of this expensive and useless arm of the service. People have ventured to hint, that it was kept up by the Court of Directors as a pet preserve of valuable patronage; and that otherwise, we should (long ere this) have seen it ruthlessly lopped off by the shears so vigorously used, at other times, in Leadenhall-street. Perhaps those corps behaved no worse than the infantry of the line have done; but it would be somewhat too absurd to continue longer to keep up, at so enormous an expense, this black burlesque on British lancers or dragoons. Let us have something we can really depend upon; and no one would venture to say, that in five regiments of British dragoons we should not have more for our money, than in the ten native corps on which it is now thrown away. Man for man, I believe few would not prefer the irregular to the regular native cavalry soldier, even with all the advantage the latter has, in being mounted on a horse, which has cost the government some £60. The fact is, the native regular cavalry was but little better than a great *sham;* they never could learn to ride in the Horse-Guard's fashion they were taught ; they looked very pretty on parade, but that was all, or very nearly so. They have done good service on some occasions; but the misfortune was, we could never depend upon the occasion.

Fifty Native Infantry Regiments of the Line would, I think, be as small a force, as could be considered sufficient to spread over so vast a territory (as is comprised in the Bengal Presidency) the brigades, and regiments necessary to occupy the numerous positions where a military force is required: for an army is not less indispensable for the security of the state, from the fact that it may itself prove a source of danger. The danger it may itself occasion, it is, in some measure, within our own power to avert; while

the dangers, against which it guards us, are otherwise entirely beyond our control.

By merging all contingents and local corps in one grand army, recruited from all parts of India, we destroy that cohesion which made each regiment a mere body of militia men, all drawn from the same districts, and united by what are, in some degree, common interests and feelings: a state of things obviously fraught with peril to an alien government such as ours. It is, I think, our obvious policy to strive as much as possible to transfer the feeling of being aliens to the men themselves; to arrange regiments so, that, in whatever district they may be, the majority of the men will be foreigners there, and thus be more disposed to identify themselves with the government, which is the only point all should have in common. Each section of the classes which composed the whole force, would thus find itself associated with strangers, who (combined) were more powerful than itself; and would feel itself in a foreign service, not in the sense hitherto obtaining (where the government alone was foreign), but much in the same way, though not, of course, in the same degree that European troops are.

The advantage of having a compact army of 50,000 men, reserved for duties exclusively military, and always with their colors, is very obvious; and they would probably be more valuable than twice that number selected from the present heterogeneous conglomeration of regular, and irregular corps, and contingents, which is supposed to make up an army. With fifty irregular regiments, to take all miscellaneous duties, and occupy the more settled parts of the country (where a show of power is required rather than the reality), I think every object desirable would be attained.

In locating the European troops, we should be chiefly influenced by a regard to their preservation;

and as it could hardly be said, that men who do no duty, but fighting, are in time of peace required more in one place than in another, it would be better, as far as possible, to mass them at the most salubrious stations.

In transferring twenty Queen's regiments to the Indian establishment, it would be impossible to apportion them, among the armies of the various Presidencies, in any ratio that might not require re-adjustment; and it would appear a simpler plan to throw the whole European force—Royal and Company's troops—into one, and distribute them as might be required. The advantage of having three distinct native armies is obvious enough, but I see no good reason why a European regiment should belong to one Presidency more than to another; though a corps might (as far as was otherwise found convenient) be allowed to remain in the Presidency for which it was originally raised.

The difficulty that might be started as to the officers having an interest in separate funds—Orphan, and Military—would be very easily met, by government taking these in hand. Indeed, government ought from the first to have considered it a part of its own obligations, to make a provision for the widows and orphans of its officers, who fall in its service; and it may now repair the neglect, by taking over the assets of each institution, and deducting from the pay of the officers the subscriptions they paid their respective funds.

It might, perhaps, object to the insolvent state of the Bengal Military Fund; but I should much like to know what made our fund insolvent? I acquit government of having intentionally done us any wrong in the matter of the exchanges, loudly though so many officers declare that we have been defrauded; but I am by no means so sure that we are not really entitled to a large sum, as to which it has made a little mis-

take. But the real cause why our fund has become so embarrassed is, that so many married men have been killed in the endless campaigns, which have been carried on; and I think it is little creditable to the government to withhold its aid, where the difficulties have really thus been incurred in its own service.

The government has looked coolly on, while poor widows have had to submit to a deduction of 10 per cent. on their small pittances; and thus have to lament not only their widowhood but, the privation of what is necessary for their support, through the zeal and courage with which their husbands served the state. Officers' allowances are tolerably liberal, and I do not think, on this score, they can complain; but if these are assumed to be so large, as to justify any meanness in transferring perpetually new burthens upon them, I think the service will soon have little to recommend it. People don't care about expatriating themselves, except for some decided pecuniary benefit.

While on the subject of allowances, I trust I may be pardoned for offering a suggestion, of the advisability of reducing or raising these to *round sums*.

How that precision was attained which has defined to a fraction of a farthing, the exact money value of the services of each grade, I confess I am at a loss to conjecture. The genius that discovered and revealed to the government, that the precise wage that should monthly be paid to an Ensign (say, for example) is neither more nor less than Co.'s Rs. 202·12·5 (representing in English money, 202 florins, 12 three halfpenny bits, and 5 half-farthings), would, I am sure, have conferred an inestimable advantage on the Society of Actuaries had he left a detailed statement of those abstruse calculations, by which he arrived at such a perfection of accuracy. The light that would have thus been thrown on the science of calculations would have been of inestimable benefit, in reducing it to a certainty; had the paper, which has been lost to

the world, even stopped short of the details which were so triumphantly carried out in determining, with a like (fractional farthing) nicety, what was the due of all the other grades.

What I would suggest, however, is, that though the government has the satisfaction of knowing, that it does not pay one of its servants a half of a farthing more than is just the correct thing, yet this advantage might, perhaps, be profitably sacrificed by the consideration of the gain in simplifying their accounts, by adopting round numbers. Not to shock the Honorable Court by too sweeping a change at the outset, suppose we were to deal with the coppers. Three annas and seven pies added to an Ensign's pay (and representing only five-pence, one farthing and a half, English), would suffice to obviate the necessity of adding complication to accounts, that in any way are none of the clearest. But if such an expenditure were pronounced, in full conclave, to be inadmissible, I think I could answer for its not exciting one-tenth of the disgust, which has been occasioned by other of the Court's acts, if it were to send out orders for immediately cutting 12 annas, and 7 pies, from the pay of Ensigns, and all fractional coppers from that of its other servants.

I feel that I deserve the thanks of the Honorable Court (when next they meet in council) for having pointed out the feasibility of making a saving, which I do not apprehend that they will think despicable; especially when they consider, that having thus got a paring off (the rind), they may be better able, at some future time, to make a dig into the cheese itself. At all events, let them look at the result of the present operation—say of ensigns alone, before we go on to the other grades—some 750, at one shilling and six-pence, half-penny, farthing, half-farthing, how much would that be? Something quite worthy of the Honorable Court's consideration, I feel very sure;

but I really have not time now to make the calculation. I must get on with my work.*

A vast deal of nonsense has, for many years past been talked regarding the pampering and petting of the Bengal Sepoy; and my Lord Dalhousie has endorsed the opinion, by asserting (in the couple of lines which suffice him to sum up all that is worth noticing in regard to the native soldier) that his condition has been improved to that degree, at which further improvement is almost an impossibility. It would, perhaps, be unreasonable to demand from the noble Lord explanations on a subject, which (to judge by such notice as he has been pleased to bestow on it, in a minutely prolix minute on the concerns of India) could have had the benefit of little more than the nineteen hundredth part of his attention directed to it; but I should be glad to derive, from any source, information as to the nature of the improvements constantly hinted at.

It is true, no doubt, that (some eighteen years ago, if I recollect right) the rule was abolished, which rendered the Sepoy liable to stoppages from his pay while in hospital; but the feeling that suggested this change, though kind, was a mistaken one; and the indulgence has had a most prejudicial effect, in encouraging malingering, and shirking duty. Few good men go much to hospital; consequently such obtained small pecuniary benefit through the relaxation, and have had much extra duty imposed on them, by the malingering it encouraged. The indulgence should, at all events, be restricted to those suffering from

* I stop not to speak—though I certainly *think* a great deal—of the indignity offered to gentlemen in tendering half farthings for their acceptance. Our Government makes so much fuss about half a farthing that it would be quite unable to understand the force of an objection such as this!

wounds, or ill health contracted while on active service.

Further, within the last dozen years, a trifle, as hutting money, has been granted native soldiers; but, under certain limitations, and restrictions, that often render the regulation a dead letter.

Lastly, compensation is allowed them for dearness of provisions in case — as his Lordship has pleased to rule — such should reach what might be called famine prices. Then the government works out some abstruse calculations, showing, that compensation, ranging from 1 to 6 or 8 half-farthings is due to each man; and generously proceeds to disburse it. The generosity brings its own reward in the gratification the government feels in reflecting upon it, and trumpeting it forth on all occasions; but I never could observe that the munificence excited any lively emotion among the recipients. On the contrary, I have frequently seen it taken with a grin, which was highly suggestive of the witticisms passed on it in the lines; such, perhaps, as the somewhat larger *remuneration* of three farthings drew from poor *Costard*.

I fearlessly assert that these indulgences combined have not added one rupee per annum (on the average) to each soldier's pay; and, within my recollection, nothing else has been done to enable the authorities to reach this much vaunted *ne plus ultra* state of improvement in the Sepoys' condition—unless, indeed, it be urged, that the sacrifice they have made of truth, in the praises which, on various public occasions they have bestowed on the native soldiery, constitutes a real claim on their gratitude.

On the other hand, though I will not affirm that the Sepoys can complain of any gross wrong done them, yet they certainly can show grounds for their constant assertion, that, as our empire progresses, our service becomes less valuable to them; and that the improvements, effected by that enlightened policy

which they are too ignorant to appreciate, deprive them, from time to time, of privileges which, from long use, they had always regarded as their rights.

First, I would remark that repeated annexations have so increased our empire, as to render necessary an entire change in the distribution of the army.

It is not 12 years ago since the most northerly of our divisions was Sirhind; now it is Peshawur, some 500 miles further. Then we had but 2 native infantry corps, to the north of Kurnal — now there are 4, within the Cis-Sutledge, besides 26 pushed far beyond that.

In the south our frontier station was Khyouk Phyoo in Arracan, where we kept one corps; now it has been extended some few hundred miles further to Pegu, where we have 3 regiments.

Thus 31 out of the 74 native infantry regiments of the line, or as nearly as possible three-sevenths of that arm, have been transferred, to occupy what to them are foreign countries; and which neither they, nor the government, contemplated that they ever would have to garrison.

To any one possessing the slightest acquaintance with native character, it would be superfluous to point out the disgust, which such changes must have occasioned in the minds of these mercenaries, who, sharing only in the honour and glory of our conquests, do not feel such to afford any consolation for the evils incident thereto.

All the affections of the Sepoy are concentrated in his own family, his sympathies extend not beyond his own village; and, of course, the further he is removed from that sphere, the more discontented or unhappy he is. The extraordinary fatigue these men so joyfully undergo in walking to their homes, the expense they so cheerfully incur (in addition to the sacrifice of their batta, while thus absent), prove the force of these feelings in a race, whose natural indolence and penuriousness are excessive.

But so inadequate is now the numerical strength of the Bengal army for the enormous amount of duty imposed upon it, that regiments have to be kept eight or ten years in the Punjab, ere they can be relieved. In the Peshawur division the troops are denied all furlough; but during the entire time that corps remain in the Punjab, not more than one half of the men have the opportunity afforded them of visiting their homes. The furlough season lasts from April to October; and for men who have to march some 1,500 miles, in going and returning, it is obvious that this is barely sufficient; and that the greater part of the time will be occupied on the journey. On the other hand, when the regiment is in the north-west provinces, the seven months' leave may be divided between two men, and yet allow to each as long a time to spend at home. In addition to this, there is a further sacrifice of a much prized indulgence, granted throughout the furlough months, of thirty days' leave to three men per company, without any loss of batta; for so few men would be able to reach their homes, from any part of the Punjab, in fifteen days, that the regulation hardly ever benefits any one. As the commanding officer can, moreover, use his own discretion in giving leave for periods of a week, to such men as he thinks deserving, there is yet another great boon lost to the men by being stationed in the Punjab.

To estimate the real severity of this privation to the Bengal Sepoy, we must consider his peculiar customs, and idiosyncracy. For him, a wife may be called a social and religious necessity; and his first thought, after obtaining service, is to supply the want, if not already married. But the Hindoo is afflicted with canonical laws, more inconvenient far than those invented by "Apostolical Succession" churches. A period of some three months is fixed upon by the Brahmins (being determined by some

idiotical astrological calculations); and only during this period, in each year, can any Hindoo marriage be celebrated.

In the face of so many difficulties, we may imagine what chance the young Sepoy, or elderly widower, has of realising what he considers the great object of his existence. As for the married men, their position is scarcely better; for, as it is repugnant to their feelings to bring their wives to the regiment, they are condemned to long years of separation, relieved only by visits of the shortest duration.

I am far from asserting, that Government had no right to locate these men in their newly acquired territories, albeit they had been enlisted with a view to employment in a far more circumscribed sphere; but I do think the policy of reducing the extra allowances, drawn in such stations, was somewhat doubtful. Extra batta is now granted only in Peshawur; and the genuine delight the men exhibit, when they receive the order to leave that station, proves how little even money (their great idol) is considered a compensation for banishment to remote stations. The question, however, which I am discussing, is not the wisdom of Lord Dalhousie's retrenchments; it is the value of the assertion, that the Sepoy's condition had been brought to the *ne plus ultra* of improvement.

But the whole tendency of our legislation has had the effect of depriving the Sepoy of many substantial advantages he possessed, both in the profit of plundering, and the gratification of bullying the villages.

I hope no one will imagine that I am an advocate for the continuance of such abuses. I only wish the reform were extended to all abuses at home—that those sinecurists, and pensioners, who plunder the country, were summarily deprived of such means of subsistence, and left to starve if indisposed to work honestly. But will the illustrious Warden of the

Cinque Ports pretend to affirm, that a cheerful and ready renunciation of the right of battening on a country, or on individuals should be expected only in the lower ranks, and among heathen mercenaries? If not, he may believe that such measures, however excellent in themselves, have certainly reduced the value of government employment to our Sepoys, just as it might possibly become less prized by noble Lords, were there no oligarchy to bestow privileges which, in their case, are of course a prescriptive right.

With regard to the Sepoys, however, the broom has been applied somewhat too energetically, since their treatment by the civil authorities is marked by a peculiar harshness; and, as if in spite for past offences, the price of supplies is everywhere raised: besides, while the army has every year been more and more harassed by commands, escorts, reliefs, and the perpetual choppings, and changes, devised to make 74 regiments do work sufficient for about 150, the men are driven to their wits ends to obtain carriage, even at the greatly enhanced rates now fixed: official supineness, corruption, and dilatoriness being all against their chance of succeeding. Of course my Lord Dalhousie, whose marching establishment cost the state £50,000 per annum (and who was permitted, on one occasion, to expend about half as much more, through providing a separate marching establishment for his wife) could no more conceive why Sepoys, or their officers should have any difficulty about carriage, than the amiable princess could imagine why people should ever die of hunger, when she heard that nice buns cost but a penny a piece.

In like manner, I dare say the noble Lord did not imagine, that he inflicted any appreciable injury on the Sepoys, when, on introducing cheap postage, he abolished their right of having their letters franked. But the Sepoy has no love for letter-writing, and the very strongest affection for his pice: so, important as

were the advantages conferred upon the general community by the measure, for him all that it effected was, his subjection to a small tax. The two or three letters per annum, which he could previously send free, amply sufficed for his wants; and he would not be at the pains of writing any larger number, even if he could dispatch them at half a farthing a piece.

I could adduce many more examples of the fresh disadvantages, that can be discovered in that condition, which Lord Dalhousie conceives he has improved to the uttermost; but I will content myself with a single additional instance, and one that is due to Lord Dalhousie himself. I refer to the difficulties that, within the last four or five years, have been thrown in the way of native soldiers getting transferred to the pension establishment.

The very abuse of this institution, which, for so many years was supinely allowed by the government (especially on the Bombay side, where it still, I believe, continues unchecked), the matter-of-course sort of way in which any who had served their time were, without any real incapacity for further service, granted pensions if they wished to leave, naturally begat in the Sepoy the idea, that regulations so convenient for him would be continued in perpetuity.

Always in extremes either of supineness, or rigour, the government have now laid down rules so strict, that it is almost an impossibility for any man to get transferred for a pension. I have myself seen numbers of men rejected by medical committees, on the ground—not that they were still fit for service but—that they had not that complication of infirmities, which rendered them unfit for every kind of duty, and consequently fit objects to be invalided, according to the construction put upon this order by the government.

Commanding officers (not to be behind medicos in the display of such zeal as does not affect their own

interests) have now generally abstained from sending up any men, who, by any make-shift, may be retained. Thus they keep a man who can hardly see, but whose hearing is good; or a man as deaf as a post, but who is not purblind; and the two combined give the full complement of senses required!

I have seen a man, sent up because he was literally a fool, rejected by the medical committee, with the facetious remark that "if they invalided all the fools in the army, there would be few men left in it." Now, in the 52nd Native Infantry (one of the few corps that have remained faithful) they have had a fool for some time, and, of course, it would not do to invalid him; but that fool the other day (as we read in accounts from India) very nearly excited the regiment to mutiny, by attacking the adjutant, and trying to stab him. A less matter than this has, of late, been sufficient to turn the scale against us.

So much for particular results, accruing from not invaliding fools; while generally the consequence of this penny wisdom is, that a number of useless men are retained on full pay, who are themselves anxious to retire on half-pay; and the government would really have as efficient an army if it got rid of these, without filling up their places. But of more serious import was it, as bearing upon our present difficulties, that through this cause the Sepoys entered upon the mutiny with the feeling, that whatever they sacrificed in regard to pay, pension was now too remote a contingency to be taken into account, and had practically been abolished by the Sirkar. The importance of this consideration, however, I think is little likely to be understood by government, if the idea has never yet occurred to it, that some use might possibly be made, in this emergency, of its enormous army of pensioners.

I have felt no disposition to make a great deal of the grievances of the Sepoys, nor do I think them of

serious magnitude; but when so much has been said in condemnation of our over-indulgence of them, and when to this we are referred as the cause of their disorganisation, it really becomes necessary to ascertain the true merits of the case. Of the general grounds on which, as I have shown, their discontent is based, some are in a great measure unavoidable; while for others, I think, an inexpensive and efficient remedy might be provided.

The very magnitude of the calamity that has befallen us, affords some countervailing advantage in the fact, that we shall have, in a great measure, a new army to experiment upon; and will generally be rid of old Sepoys, whose reminiscences it would be difficult to dissociate from a state of things, to which it would be madness to think of returning. The good old times, when a Sepoy in the district could obtain all he wanted, simply by demanding it in virtue of his office; and could impress the first villager he met — zemindar, or coolie — to carry his bundle for him, would, to our new levies, be associated with the sut joog or golden age; and having never enjoyed the dignity and the profit of jacks-in-office, they would be content with their legitimate position of equality with the masses.

In regard to the question of pensions, I would suggest a plan which, involving no additional expense, would afford us a substantial guarantee for the fidelity of our men; and while averting the heart-burnings occasioned by withholding pensions from those who considered that they had earned them, would also relieve us from the supposed necessity of retaining on full pay men, who, for all practical purposes, had become useless.

I propose that, fixing the Sepoy's nominal pay at 7 rupees per month, an additional sum of 8 annas per month be allotted for each, to provide a fund for his retirement. To this I would add 1 rupee per

month, to be deducted from the man's own pay; and thus would the accumulation go on at the rate of 18 rupees per annum, which, at 4 per cent. compound interest, would, in the course of twenty years, amount to a considerable sum. The total amount of principal and interest might then be claimable; while for a shorter period of service, it might be fair to disallow any claim to more than the accumulations (without interest) of the 1 rupee per month, deducted from the pay of the applicant for discharge. Of course, a few special rules, to meet various circumstances, could be framed. All that I need further point out is, that the plan requires no agency to work it. The government would pay a Sepoy 6 rupees per month; and on his discharge, the accumulations of 1R^s. 8A^s. per month at 4 per cent. compound interest. It would thus get rid of the risk of being swindled, as it now is, by fraudulent pensioners; and it would get rid of the expense of pension paymasters; for wound and family pensions might be commuted to a present cash payment, and drawn in a contingent bill by the officer of the man's company.

While I am by no means disposed to underrate the advantage, and uses, to which our present army of pensioners might be turned, I yet think that, in the manner I propose, a more valuable guarantee would be obtained for the fidelity of the army actually enrolled. The men would be bound, in sums proportionate to their standing, and the trust confided in them; and had we thus held in our own hands the accumulated savings, made throughout the course of his service, by each man in our employ, I doubt whether the Mahomedans would have been so successful, as they have been, in their late plots.

Though unable to see that the Sepoy's lot has reached that Utopian state, which my Lord Dalhousie seems to have discovered, I think that, for all practical purposes, it would be sufficiently good (even as

I have suggested making it) to offer inducements to good men to enter the service; and I do not think the circumstances of the country would permit of greater advantages being offered to them. For the rest, I would recommend a few changes which, I suspect, would not generally be regarded by them with satisfaction; but which, I think, would have a salutary effect on their discipline. These are—

The restoration of flogging for insubordination or disgraceful conduct.

The re-imposition of hospital stoppages; and the

Investing the commandant with summary power to dismiss any man whose name appeared in the defaulters' book a certain number of times, within a certain specified period.

Further, having an entirely new system to establish, and chiefly new men to experiment upon, the present rule of promotion by seniority should be entirely set aside; which, hitherto, I do not think it would have been either judicious or fair to do.

With these means of rewarding, and punishing, it will be the fault of commanding officers themselves, if their regiments are not maintained in a state of the highest efficiency; and the government, has in its own hands, the simple and obvious remedy of removing such gentlemen from the service.

To the subject of high and low caste men in the army, I have for many years paid much attention; and I prefer trusting the personal experience I have gained, to being influenced by the clamour of those, who have had less opportunity of mixing with all classes.

That, physically, the high caste men of India are the best fitted for soldiers, I believe no one has attempted to deny; and it is to this circumstance, and not (as is absurdly supposed by Col. Jacob, and other

Bombay officers) to our reverence for caste, that they are indebted for the preference we give them.

Whatever may be our feelings towards the mutineers, we must at least admit, that they have on many occasions evinced remarkable courage, and resolution; and that if at other times they have behaved with apparent pusillanimity, the novelty of their position in contending, for the first time, with the men to whom they had so long been in subjection; the disadvantage of being without real leaders, or any well concerted plan, or even object; perhaps even a lingering feeling of remorse and shame; would be quite sufficient to account for this seeming inconsistency. If their courage has been tarnished by a horrible ferocity, this will neither diminish our difficulty in subduing them, nor lessen the importance of having such men on our side, instead of opposed to us.

It would be impossible to punish too severely the outrages of these Sepoys; but, having done this, we must be prepared to view the whole affair as an exceptional case, against the recurrence of which it would be no remedy, to dispense with the services of men, who, if they are not for us, will be against us. We had better, I think, at once abandon our position in India, if our dear-bought experience suggests only the discarding the agency by which it was gained, instead of remedying its obvious defects, by means which have become equally apparent.

I can affirm—after many years' intercourse with Sepoys of every caste, acknowledged as a caste at all —that the Brahmins, and the Chuttries are not only the most smart and soldier-like among the men, but that they are the best-behaved, and the most trustworthy. As to the influence which their high caste is supposed to give them, what can that amount to in a regiment, where they are numbered by hundreds, all of equally high caste?—things are valued, I apprehend, according to their rarity, rather than their com-

monness. But in what respect, I should like to know, can a high caste Hindostanee be more dangerous than a low caste one? What object of ambition does his high caste open to the one, from which low caste excludes the other? On what point, has either of them feelings, or interests, which are not shared in by all within the pale of Hindooism? People talk as if they supposed a disruption of the Hindoo system possible; as if the lower castes were struggling to obtain a fusion with the higher. Hindooism is, however, like Popery—it is immutable, and infallible, and as incapable of accommodating itself to modern civilisation. The Brahmin's position is secured to him as long as Hindooism exists, and so is that of each of the other sects: for each has something lower than itself, until we come to the lowest within the pale, which can turn up its nose at all outside this. I cannot, then, imagine anything that, in a religious point of view, the Brahmin could conspire to obtain, which he does not already possess; how he can be more than he is—a Brahmin!

It is *not a fact*, that a Brahmin is precluded from doing things which a low caste man may do with impunity, unless he be one of the lowest of the low. Sepoys there are in the Bombay army, as I am informed, who would not object to perform the nastiest offices; but I confess that I am at a loss to understand, how qualifications such as these are any recommendation for an employment, in which (it may be presumed) they will never be called forth.

I have yet also to learn, that recruits drawn from the dregs of society—from classes that for centuries have been kept subject, and degraded—can reasonably be expected to become imbued with the spirit desirable in soldiers, immediately on their exaltation to government service: or that the want of self respect would be compensated, by a disposition too tame ever to be dangerous; even were it more certain, than it is, that

thus much would be gained. We all know by experience, that the low caste man—down to a certain point—makes more fuss about what he can, or cannot do, than the Brahmin; and the reason is obvious, that the one is assured of his position, while the other is not, which makes him fidgetty. In like manner, in England, do *parvenues* prove their vulgarity, by the pains they take to avoid being suspected of it.

The corps of Sappers and Miners, with which I used to be pretty well acquainted, contains a large number of Brahmins, notwithstanding that a great part of their duty (in peace, as well as in war) consists in digging, and such work as might be supposed hurtful to the dignity, and prejudices of high caste men.

Further, not only have we always had some General Service corps—i.e. regiments raised to move by sea, or land, as required—in which Brahmins take service as freely as in any others; but all our men are now being enlisted for this General Service, and yet we find Brahmins coming forward as readily as before. They are very miserable while on ship board, I admit, but not one whit more so than any Hindoo, who has a caste at all.

The nonsense talked about caste is quite sickening, when we know that the Hindoos of every caste are imbued with the same prejudices, bound by the same rules, and, in fact, have one common feeling in their particular heathenism. The Mussulman is dangerous, and the Hindoo is dangerous, and each from the same cause, viz., the religious prejudices which all Mussulmans, and all Hindoos, respectively share in: but the Soodr is not less bigoted than the Brahmin; and the evil in the Bengal army was, *not that there were too many Brahmins, but that there were too many Hindoos;* and there was, besides this, another great evil, that all our men (Hindoos, or Mahomedans) were Hindostanees.

As to the trash which Bombay officers talk and

write of the superiority of their men to ours, it is hardly worthy of notice. Till I find that Bombay Sepoys were offered suspected cartridges, and bit them, and were exposed to such machinations as the Bengal Sepoys have been, and resisted them, I shall continue to disbelieve even in their superior fidelity or attachment to the Sirkar. But were it so manifested, I should then attribute this, not to the Chumars, and Chundals, it numbers in its ranks, or to the gentlemen it has enabled to resign their brooms, for muskets, but to the fact, that it contains a great mixture of men of *various and irreconcileable creeds*, both Jew and Gentile; and men of distinct races, that have always been hostile to each other.

I sincerely trust, however, that they may never be exposed to the trial of having to attack Bengal troops; for if they did not join their ranks, they would certainly get soundly thrashed by them.

Nothing can be gained merely by mixing high caste, and low caste men; the best man should be enlisted, be he Brahmin, or Soodr. The point of real importance is, to obtain a mixture of men of *distinct religions, and of distinct races;* to mix Hindoos with Sikhs, Mussulmans, Buddhists, Sonthals, Caffres, or any other idolaters we can get: and, as regards nationality, to mix Hindostanees with Punjabees, Belooches, Duhhunees, Affghans, etc., etc. But, if we only mix one caste of Hindoos with another, I feel very certain that we shall gain a distinction without any real difference, except in a worse quality of men.

Of the importance of having Christian soldiers, I have already spoken. The prospect of obtaining such, at present, is far too remote, I fear, to be entitled to any prominent place among those means, to which we may trust for strengthening our position; but the object should be kept steadily in view.

I have now stated what I conceive to have been the causes of our misfortunes in India, and what appear to be the most feasible remedies for them. If I have been guilty of any presumption, I can only plead that these are not the times for men to hesitate about speaking out; and my experience, extending over a service of many years, is some warrant for my having formed very decided opinions.

If I write with bitterness, it must be remembered, that my lot was never sweetened by any of the good things of the service; and as the disgust which I conceived is unquestionably genuine, so also have I shown it, I think, to be not ill founded.

I cannot but feel the most serious apprehensions for the stability of our Indian Empire, under such a policy as, I think, I can now see dimly shadowed forth. The Court of Directors appears to have been treated as a cypher — not because they had little special qualification for managing Indian affairs, but — because no special qualification seems now to be considered necessary, or anything to be trusted to, but British ideas, and British bayonets.

Hundreds of Indian officers have, I believe, been ordered to return to India; but I understand that the Court itself is unable to give them any idea of what use is to be made of their services. We hear, indeed, that some levies have been made in the Punjab; but desultory efforts, such as these, are neither adequate to meet so great an emergency, nor do they indicate that much importance is attached, to the object of securing native assistance: while the fact that no orders have yet been given for raising Company's European regiments in England, seems to point out, more plainly, a settled determination to dispense with the services of Indian officers.

If our pensions were thereby guaranteed to us by the British Government, we could have little personally to complain of, in seeing a new system inaugu-

rated. The right of Parliament to interfere, to any extent, is unquestionable; but justice requires that it should, at the same time, take upon itself every liability which it permitted its late deputy (John Company) to contract: otherwise, under such a change of system as seems impending, we feel it to be more than probable, that we shall all very soon be reduced to beggary.

I have no objection to offer to the appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the chief command in India. Under all the circumstances of the case, I think the country has great reason to feel pleased with the choice made, when it is assumed that the selection must be restricted to Queen's officers. I have little doubt that he has both the energy, and the judgment required, to make the best possible use of the European force, which he will shortly have at his command; nor do I even entertain a doubt that he will be successful in restoring an appearance of tranquility, throughout the Bengal Presidency. But it is then that difficulties more serious will arise.

We shall have the country deluged with Royal troops, whose maintenance will cause an enormous drain on the revenue. We shall have nearly all the military posts, and commands filled by officers who, whatever else they may have to recommend them, must be profoundly ignorant of the character, habits, and customs of the natives, except as regards the very blackest side of that character. Knowing them only as one entire body of miscreants, who inflicted such horrible outrages on our helpless countrymen — considering them as only incarnate fiends, whom any kindness would but encourage to revolt — hopeless of understanding their irrational prejudices, and indifferent to the importance of this — such officers would be most unlikely to stop short at the just degree of severity, which only maudlin humanitarians deprecate: they would be utterly unfitted to carry out a system

at once stern and conciliating, such as is now required to restore the native faith in our unsparing justice, and in our considerate benevolence.

The evil would be aggravated by the swarms of British soldiers spread over the country, who would be still less capable of discrimination, whose feelings would be still less under control, and who would everywhere spread that bitterness excited by the domination of foreigners, and which even a native can feel, when so practically brought home to himself.

We should thus, in fact, render the estrangement, complete, and lose that hold obtained over the native mind by a system which shows, that if foreigners, we become (*by the peculiarities of a distinct service*), in some sort, naturalised among them: through which all our own personal interests are proved to be identified with those of India; our sympathies are presumed to be enlisted in favour of those, among whom we are thus settled; and by which means, comparatively few can be thought quite ignorant of the right mode of giving expression to them.

If I augur rightly, we should simply be devising a system, which entirely ignores what is so essential, that our old system broke down from not having it in sufficient force. A few years perseverance therein would complete our isolation, and a very few added to that would see our downfall—as I would not consider our tenure of India to be worth six years' purchase, I feel considerable anxiety to know who will then pay me my pension.

I have little more to add. I have expressed myself freely; and it might be objected that I had spoken disrespectfully of those who were my "honorable masters"; but "The East India Company" is now really only a myth, and the directors, (in so far as they manage affairs), are but like myself, public servants, and amenable to public opinion. If subordinates must be prohibited from speaking of the dangers they discover in

covery of its own unfitness for its duties.

The fact, however, that the Indian press has been gagged, is quite sufficient to overcome any hesitation I might have in speaking my mind freely. Opinions may be divided as to the policy of that measure; but no one would, I think, venture to maintain that those who had in India acquired an insight into the evils of our system there, should here be under any delicacy about making the public here acquainted with them.

If I can now do no good in India, I may do some little good here. Even a mild fillip like this may make some of the team wink their eyes, though I suspect that nothing but a good double-thonging by M.P.'s will get them out of their jog-trot.

My objections to the directors are, as I have already said, based on public grounds—to incapacity *as a corporation.*

Individually, I have no reason to believe that one is below the average of those, who are often entrusted with important public interests; but were they, each and all, fifty times more able than they are, I am convinced that they could do nothing but mischief to the interests of India, in their corporate capacity, as now devised. I have made no attack on the private character of any of the officials of whom I have spoken. I should not have condescended to such personalities, even if they had laid themselves open to such attacks: and it is but justice to them to admit, that they can attribute their escape from annoyance on this score, to the fact that I know nothing that could have so been brought against them; even if they disbelieve in the moderation which would have made me avoid such topics under any circumstances.

Gaylord
PAMPHLET BIN
Syracuse, N
Stockton, Calif.

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



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